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Summary 
 
Problem statement 
Supplying materials in the right quantity and quality at the right time is a very 
important issue for the smooth operation of companies. Manufacturers are becoming 
increasingly aware of the importance of having flexibility in deliveries, due to the open 
global market in which conditions change rapidly. Customer demands are changing 
more quickly, which results in shorter product life cycles. This development places 
great importance on rapid product introductions to the market. If necessary, products 
must be altered during their product life cycle in order to meet customers’ wishes and 
demands. For this reason, delivery flexibility throughout the supply chain has become 
even more crucial. While much research has examined the impact of power within 
inter-organisational relationships, there is a lack of research into the role of power on 
the effectiveness of buyer influence strategies on supplier delivery flexibility. Clearly, 
there is a need to fill this gap in the literature; therefore, the problem investigated in 
the current study is:  
 
What is the role of power in the effectiveness of buyer influence strategies on 
supplier delivery flexibility? 
 
Research method 
Respondents in this study were purchase managers and sales managers of 
technically-orientated companies, which were members of the Dutch KIVI 
Engineering Society. The empirical aspect of the study included a survey, using 
questionnaires which were created in English and in Dutch. Given that previous 
research has shown power and interdependence to be involved in buyer–supplier 
relationships, the questionnaire was created in buyer and supplier versions. During 
data collection, it was observed that the English version was not used frequently (i.e., 
most respondents used the Dutch version). The total number of respondents was 55. 
The data were processed and analysed using SPSS Version 21, in order to examine 
any significant differences or relationships between the variables of interest.  
 
Results 
The hypotheses were that the use of coercive (threats, legalistic pleas, and promises) 
and non-coercive (requests and recommendations) influence strategies by a buyer 
would have a positive impact on supplier delivery flexibility (H1 and H2 summarised). 
In addition, a dominant power position of the buyer was expected to increase the 
effectiveness of coercive and non-coercive strategies on supplier delivery flexibility 
(H3 and H4). Mutual dependence was expected to reduce the effect of coercive 
strategies on supplier delivery flexibility (H5) and to increase the effect of non-
coercive strategies on supplier delivery flexibility (H6). Although the hypotheses were 
derived from the literature, the results of the study did not support any of the 
hypotheses. Additional analyses were performed in order to enhance the value of the 
study.  
 
The additional analyses provided interesting new insights by comparing buyers with 
suppliers on delivery flexibility. Within the different influence strategies, threats had 
the nearest result. When power or interdependence were included as moderators, 
the use of threats as an influence strategy produced more negative outcomes.  
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When considering moderating effects, the coercive influence strategy of using 
promises had an impact on delivery flexibility, whereby the effect of using promises 
was stronger in cases where there were higher levels of interdependence between 
the buyer and the supplier. At the variable level of the construct Promises, we found 
that the effect of promises was not equally assessed by buyers and suppliers. It 
appears that suppliers do not consider the use of promises as an extremely hard 
coercion strategy; that is, it is likely that they would classify promises as a soft 
coercion strategy.  
 
A significant difference between buyers and suppliers was found regarding Legalistic 
pleas. Legalistic pleas refer to previously made agreements that could have a 
positive impact on delivery flexibility. In the case of legalistic pleas, the buyer puts 
pressure on the supplier by reminding the supplier of an agreement made earlier (in 
the contract) or about what the law subscribes. Interestingly, suppliers appear to view 
legalistic pleas differently from buyers – they consider legalistic pleas to be a very 
hard coercive influence strategy. An explanation for the difference between buyers’ 
and suppliers’ perceptions of this strategy could be that buyers believe they are 
merely reminding suppliers of the agreement or refreshing their memories using 
facts. As such, buyers are likely to underestimate how tough and coercive legalistic 
pleas are perceived by suppliers. 
 
In the current study, we have found some new insights regarding the differences 
between buyers’ and suppliers’ perceptions of the power position. This perception 
subsequently will colour buyers’ and suppliers’ perceived level of interdependence. It 
was also observed that, in general, buyers are more concerned about the 
substitutability of the supplier than vice versa.  
 
Recommendations 
This study has several limitations, which would justify further research. Future 
research could increase the sample size in order to improve the reliability of the 
results. Future research in this field could include a mapping of the coerciveness 
level of legalistic pleas. Similarly, new investigations into possible interactions 
between perceived power positions and interdependence could be considered, as we 
have observed a discrepancy in the perception of the power position. With the use of 
Porter’s 5 Forces Model, new ideas could be formulated and investigated about a 
more precise proposition of the power position and interdependence. In the current 
study, it was observed that the perception of buyers and suppliers regarding their 
mutual position is not equal. Further research on this topic could lead to important 
new insights into the power position and interdependence of buyers and suppliers. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
Supplying materials and machines to buyers at the right time and to the right 
standard and quantity is currently a hot topic in business (Clemens & Douglas, 2006; 
Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Manufacturers are becoming increasingly aware of the 
importance of flexibility in their deliveries, due to the open global market, which drives 
market conditions to change rapidly (Karassik, Krutzsch, Fraser, & Messina, 1986). 
That is, customer demands are changing more quickly, which results in shorter 
product life cycles. This development stresses the importance of rapid product 
introductions to the market. If necessary, products must be altered during their 
product life cycle in order to meet the wishes and demands of customers. For this 
reason, delivery flexibility in the supply chain is more crucial – it is the criterion for 
receiving product orders (Giunipero, Denslow, & Eltantawy, 2005). Delivery flexibility 
concerns the ability to adjust delivery time and to integrate special requests in orders 
(Beamon, 1999; Ketokivi, 2006; Upton, 1995). 
 
The term influence strategy refers to the means by which power is applied to achieve 
influence (Shamdasani et al., 2001). Within inter-organisational settings, influence 
strategies can be considered as ‘‘compliance gaining tactics that channel members 
use to achieve their desired actions from channel partners’’ (Frazier & Summers, 
1984, p. 44). Manufacturers can use influence strategies as instruments aimed at 
gaining compliance from suppliers (Frazier & Summers, 1986; Payan & McFarland, 
2005). Influence strategies are used to affect behaviour and to improve delivery 
performance, resulting in a positive outcome for the user across inter-firm 
relationships (Ulaga & Eggert, 2006). Obviously, companies that do not use influence 
strategies could miss opportunities to improve their competitiveness by 
underestimating customer–supplier flexibility capabilities (Sanchez & Perez, 2005). 
 
The efficiency of influence strategies is likely to depend on the extent of the power 
position of the source (the manufacturer) relative to the target (the supplier; Hu & 
Sheu, 2005). Research has been undertaken in relation to power positions. Kale 
(1986), for example, reports that there is a positive relationship between the 
frequency with which influence strategies are used and the manufacturer’s perceived 
power. Dominant suppliers use a range of influence strategies, which they consider 
effective in achieving compliance and cooperation from buyers. Numerous 
distribution channel researchers (e.g., Frazier & Summers, 1984; Lusch & Brown, 
1982; Maloni & Benton, 2000) have found that powerful sources tend to use non-
coercive influence strategies, which is logically supported by the idea that using 
coercion may risk their power advantage (Boyle & Dwyer, 1995; Frazier & Rody, 
1991). If a power-holding manufacturer is not aware of their own power arsenal, nor 
understands how such power affects its integration efforts, the firm risks an 
ineffective or misdirected supply chain strategy (Maloni & Benton, 2000). 
 
Much research has been conducted into the impact of power roles on inter-
organisational relationships; however, there is a lack of such research on buyer 
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influence strategies and supplier delivery flexibility. There is a strategic need for 
research that could fill this gap in our body of knowledge. As such, the problem 
statement for the current research is:  
 
What is the role of power in the effectiveness of buyer influence strategies on 
supplier delivery flexibility? 
 
This paper will be organised as follows: First, in Section 2, the literature is reviewed 
on delivery flexibility, influence strategies, and power. In addition, the hypotheses and 
the conceptual framework for this research will be presented. Subsequently, details 
about the research design and methods will be presented, followed by the results of 
our study. Finally, Section 5 will provide some conclusions and recommendations for 
future research.  
 
1.2 Research method 
The goal of the current study was to examine the effect of power positions on the 
influence strategies used by companies in a mutual relationship of purchasing and 
sales. Data were obtained by conducting a survey among approximately 600 
purchasers and sales managers, most of whom were members of the Dutch 
Commercial Engineer group of KIVI Engineering Society, The Netherlands. The 
target group of this research was Dutch companies with a technical background, 
such as manufacturing or technical services.  
 
The questionnaire was constructed using five-point Likert scales for all variables, 
ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The questions focussed on 
the delivery flexibility, the reported response towards several influence strategies, 
and the perceived power position of the company. The data were analysed using 
SPSS Version 21. 
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2 Literature review 
 
2.1 Supplier delivery flexibility 
Delivery flexibility concerns the ability to adjust delivery time and to integrate special 
requests in orders (Beamon, 1999; Ketokivi, 2006; Upton, 1995). The flexibility of the 
supplier regarding delivery time, volume, and product mix (preferably without adding 
significant extra costs) is important in order to meet the high-paced and frequently-
changing standards of their customers (Gilmore & Pine, 1997).  
 
In more stable economic environments (i.e., low uncertainty), companies should 
focus on efficiency, while environments with high uncertainty require a shift towards 
flexibility (Merschmann & Thonemann, 2011). Flexibility can be described as either 
internal (Upton, 1995), pertaining to the capabilities or performances (competencies) 
of the company, or external, which refers to the capabilities of the company as 
perceived by their customers. 
 
Several studies have classified delivery flexibility as internal or external (Caniëls & 
Roeleveld, 2009; Nigel, 2005; Payan & McFarland, 2005; Upton, 1995). A company’s 
internal flexibility reflects their ability to change or react to changes in market 
conditions with little cost in time, effort, financial loss, or performance (Upton, 1995). 
It is, therefore, related to a firm’s operational efficiency, based on competence 
(Chang & Huang, 2012), and to their manufacturing flexibility. Conversely, the 
external flexibility is more related to that of the supply chain (Duclos, Vokurka, & 
Lummus, 2003), which can also directly influence a firm’s competitiveness. If the 
delivery flexibility of the suppliers affects the delivery performance of the 
manufacturer in a negative way, the manufacturer must put more effort into the 
internal organisation in order to overcome the effects of non-compliance by the 
suppliers. To achieve a high degree of customer satisfaction (i.e., deliver products of 
a high quality on time and at low-cost), firms must look beyond their internal flexibility 
(Leslie, Robert, & Rhonda, 2003; Zhang, Vonderembse, & Lim, 2002). That is, having 
a grip on the delivery flexibility of suppliers is important for the company’s overall 
delivery flexibility.  
 
In this study, the focus is on the delivery flexibility of the supplier. In particular, the 
focus will be on the effects of the power position on delivery time and meeting special 
requests. As a technical environment was chosen (in a niche market), volume 
flexibility and mix flexibility were not considered to be main issues. In this typical 
business-to-business (B2B) model, the added value of products is high and the 
products produced are quite project specific. Nevertheless, the number of (and cost 
associated with) repeat orders can be considerable.  
  
2.2 Coercive strategies 
In the literature on buyer–supplier relationships, influence strategies are described as 
tools used by buyers to gain greater compliance of suppliers by influencing their 
behaviour to a more preferred outcome. Frazier and Summers (1984) categorised six 
different types of coercive and non-coercive influence strategies. Coercive influence 
strategies are more direct, and the implications of non-performance by the supplier is 
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more recognisable to the buyer. Forms of coercive strategies (Frazier & Summers, 
1984) include:  
 
- Threats. The buyer threatens the supplier with sanctions in the near future if 
the supplier does not comply with the request.  
 
Research has shown that this approach results in fewer positive outcomes (El-Ansary 
& Stern, 1972; Wiertz et al., 2004) and is less effective than other coercive influence 
strategies (Lai, 2009), such as: 
 
- Legalistic pleas. The buyer reminds the supplier that contracts or agreements 
require the compliance of the target. This approach has more of a judicial 
backbone, where, for example, the law could be involved in cases of non-
performance.  
 
- Promises. By offering the supplier future incentives, the buyer tries to get 
confirmation from the target. If the supplier will not show compliance then 
these incentives will be lost.  
 
There has been some debate over whether or not the use of promises constitutes a 
coercive influence strategy (cf. non-coercive). On one hand, for example, Gary, 
Frazier, and Summers (1984) maintain that promises are coercive, because when the 
buyer uses this strategy, the supplier is aware of the possible future rewards if they 
comply. However, previous research (e.g., Byskov, Jacobsen, & Pedersen, 2003; 
French & Raven, 2001) suggests that promises are not coercive as an influence 
strategy, because they draw on reward power (cf. negative consequences). That is, if 
a buyer offers a supplier (future) incentives, no indication is made of the negative 
sanctions to be expected if the supplier does not comply with the request. Similarly, 
Caniëls and Roeleveld (2009) claim that influence strategies could be categorised 
based on their coercive intensity; they argue that threats and legalistic pleas are hard 
coercive strategies, while promises are soft coercive strategies. In other studies, 
promises have been shown to be related positively to threats and legalistic pleas 
(Frazier & Summers, 1984; Kale, 1986). In the current study, this categorisation was 
used, and so we classified threats, legalistic pleas, and promises as coercive 
influence strategies.  
 
Coercive strategies are high-pressure attempts to influence suppliers to elicit a 
desired response (Frazier & Summers, 1986). Several previous studies have found 
that the use of coercive strategies is harmful towards the relationship between the 
buyer and the supplier (Boyle & Dwyer, 1995; Frazier & Summers, 1986; Maloni & 
Benton, 2000). In addition, previous research has clearly demonstrated that threats 
and legalistic pleas reduce supplier satisfaction, as they are likely to hinder a 
cooperative atmosphere, which is an important factor for suppliers (Wong, 2000). 
These findings imply that in order to avoid creating a negative relationship, the 
supplier has to show compliance towards the buyer in response to their use of 
coercive strategies. Studies have revealed that manufacturers adopt coercive 
strategies for situations in which their advantage is unlikely to be diminished (Frazier, 
Gill, & Kale, 1989; Kale, 1986). Importantly for the current study, research has shown 
that coercive influence strategies affect the delivery flexibility of suppliers (Chu, 
Chang, & Huang, 2012). Dominant suppliers appear to only recognise the 
compliance or non-compliance of buyers in response to coercive influence strategies, 
while buyers report that they also use partial and delayed compliance. In addition, 
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dominant suppliers are not concerned about the negative effects of using coercive 
strategies (Gelderman, Semeijn, & De Zoete, 2008). Finally, a recent study found a 
positive impact of coercion on changing the environmental behaviour of the targets 
(Lai, 2009). 
 
Given the findings presented above, the following hypothesis was generated:  
 
H1. The use of coercive strategies by a buyer has a positive impact on supplier 
delivery flexibility. 
 
2.3 Non-coercive strategies 
Non-coercive influence strategies are more gentle approaches used by buyers 
towards suppliers (Frazier & Summers, 1984). The buyer does not explicitly state the 
consequences of a supplier’s non-performance, thus non-coercive strategies 
encourage suppliers to work with manufacturers to resolve problems (Frazier & Rody, 
1991). Forms of non-coercive strategies include:  
 
- Requests. The buyer simply asks the target to act, without mentioning or 
implying subsequent sanctions, requests, or rewards. It should be noted that a 
request can be seen by the target as being coercive, as the request could be 
interpreted as a command rather than a suggestion. The effects of a request 
can be examined by a supplier with vigilance in order to avoid incorrectly 
interpreting the buyer’s request. As the punishment for non-compliance to a 
request is unknown, and so cannot be overlooked, this strategy has been 
classified as coercive elsewhere (Chang & Huang, 2012; Payan & McFarland, 
2005). However, past research has also classified requests as an inferred 
argument rather than inferred sanctions. In the current thesis, this non-
coercive view of requests is adopted.  
 
- Information exchange. The buyer gives their opinion about how the supplier 
could perform more successfully, by sharing their vision on general business 
issues and operation procedures, without stating a request. 
 
- Recommendations. The buyer makes direct recommendations towards some 
specific action or set of actions and describes how the supplier could benefit if 
they fulfil these specific actions. Nevertheless, no negative consequences are 
presented. 
 
Non-coercive influence strategies are used by the source with an intention to change 
the belief(s) or aspiration(s) of the target. Non-coercive influence strategies have an 
incomplete argument structure and place less pressure on the target (Payan, 2006). 
For example, suppliers might benefit from making investments for new machines, 
logistical systems, or to hire skilled people to fulfil the desires of the source. In this 
case, the negative consequences of non-compliance are not stated clearly, which 
implies to the target that the influence strategy is non-obligatory. Consequently, the 
target will act based on their own free will, resulting in a more positive outcome for 
their relationship with the source. Research has found that trust enhances a 
successful relationship (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Wiertz et al., 2004). In line with this, a 
positive relationship has been reported to be associated with joint action(s) (Joshi & 
11 
 
Arnold, 1997). Therefore, suppliers adopt more non-coercive strategies (Clemens & 
Douglas, 2006). 
 
In accordance with the discussion above, we hypothesised:  
 
H2. The use of non-coercive strategies by a buyer will have a positive impact on 
supplier delivery flexibility. 
 
2.4 Power  
In the literature, power has several operationalisations. Power and interdependence 
are generally considered to be important concepts for understanding buyer–supplier 
relationships (e.g., Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). Two of the most cited types of 
power relationships between buyers and suppliers are their relative power position 
and their dependence-based power. A buyer’s relative power is defined as the 
difference between the supplier’s dependence on the buyer and the buyer’s 
dependence on the supplier. The relative power between buyer and supplier is also 
related to their punitive capabilities. However, the implications of dependence-based 
power for buyer–supplier relationships are fundamentally different from those based 
on punitive capabilities (Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1998). Punitive capability is a 
firm’s ability to inflict negative consequences on the partner (e.g., the ability to file 
lawsuits against the partner), and this type of power has a very different flavour from 
that based on dependence (Kumar, 2005). In the case of punitive capability, the 
source has the resources to punish the target for their own benefit.  
 
The sign of the net dependence between the two parties indicates the relative power 
of one organisation over the other (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010). If company A 
depends on company B more than B depends on A, then B has power over A 
(Pfeffer, 1981). In a buyer–supplier relationship characterised by asymmetric 
interdependence, the partner with higher relative power may attempt to exploit it 
(Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Frazier & Rody, 1991; Geyskens, Steenkamp, Scheer, & 
Kumar, 1996). Dominant suppliers do not expect retaliation from their use of coercive 
strategies, and a buyer’s compliance suggests the relatively frequent use of coercive 
influence strategies by dominant suppliers. Thus, dominant suppliers consider hard 
coercive strategies to be very effective (Gelderman et al., 2008). In general, a 
dominant power position of the buyer is associated with fewer possibilities for 
supplier opportunism (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Ireland & Webb, 2007; Joshi & 
Arnold, 1997; Rokkan & Haugland, 2002). A possible explanation for this could be 
that various costs are likely for the supplier if the buyer terminates their relationship.  
 
Consequently, dependent suppliers will likely avoid opportunistic behaviour, because 
they view their relationship with the buyer as important and aim to preserve it (Joshi 
& Arnold, 1997; Provan & Skinner, 1989). Similarly, supplier opportunism could be 
reciprocated by a powerful buyer. The mere knowledge that a buyer might exercise 
his dominant power position as a result of non-compliance by the supplier will make 
the supplier afraid of the repercussions. Hence, a supplier’s fear of repercussions 
from the buyer results in a dominant power position of the buyer, which creates an 
opportunity for the buyer to employ coercive strategies (Joshi & Arnold, 1997). 
 
Based on these findings, we hypothesised that: 
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H3. A dominant power position of the buyer increases the effects of coercive 
strategies on supplier delivery flexibility.  
 
Non-coercive strategies may take considerable time to implement effectively (Frazier 
& Summers, 1984; Kasulis & Spekman, 1980). Therefore, only suppliers with 
relatively high power in their dyadic relationships (Wells & Sawyer, 1955) are 
expected to be able to utilise non-coercive strategies effectively, as only they will 
have the necessary time and attention of the target. Sources with relatively low power 
may attempt to use non-coercive influence strategies, but find that targets are simply 
unreceptive to them. 
 
Hence, we hypothesised that:  
 
H4. A dominant power position of the buyer increases the effects of non-coercive 
strategies on supplier delivery flexibility.  
 
2.5 Interdependence 
Another form of power can be expertise (Raven & French, 1958) or resources. When 
a firm possesses resources that generate rewards and benefits for its partner that 
cannot be easily replaced by another, the partner becomes dependent on that firm. 
The concept of interdependence is regularly used as a moderator in studies about 
inter-firm influence strategies (Ghijsen et al., 2010) and studies on influence and 
conflict (Frazier & Summers, 1984). 
 
The power and interdependence literature makes a clear distinction between the 
concepts of: (1) relative power, which is the result of interdependence asymmetry; 
and (2) total power (commonly referred to as total interdependence), which is the 
result of complete interdependence of both parties (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; 
Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Gulati & Sytch, 2007). In accordance with Bacharach 
and Lawler (1981, p. 61), total interdependence in a relationship is measured by “the 
sum of the parties’ dependence on one another.” Other research has found that the 
level of mutuality between firms can sharpen the definition of interdependence. 
Mutual interdependence is defined as an equal or common level of dependence on 
each other (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). The dotted diagonal line presented in 
Figure 1 shows situations in which buyers and suppliers have equally high levels of 
dependence. Even if two separate relationships are in balance in terms of their 
actor’s dependence levels (i.e., as represented by the solid line in Figure 1), they 
may have different behavioural implications if they are balanced at different levels of 
interdependence (Gronquist & Berges, 2013).  
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Low levels of interdependence often reflect buyer–supplier relationships that are 
concerned with non-critical routine products, which often have a small value per unit. 
Ambiguities in these relationships are more likely to be interpreted negatively (e.g., 
Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). In contrast, a high level of interdependence 
indicates a strong, cooperative relationship (Gronquist & Berges, 2013) in which both 
parties have invested, and one which is characterised by mutual trust and mutual 
commitment (Conley, 2008). In the words of Gulati and Sytch “…higher levels of joint 
dependence necessarily increase the depth of economic interaction between 
exchange partners, jumpstarting a stronger relational orientation” (2007, p. 33). 
Besides loyalty towards the other party, and the accompanying desire to continue the 
relationship, both parties know that the other party possesses much power. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that either side would use their power position as the risk of 
retaliation is considered too high (Conley, 2008; Gronquist & Berges, 2013). In 
addition, when total interdependence is high, both partners are often faced with high 
exit barriers. The literature reveals that when the degree of total dependence 
between suppliers and retailers increases, suppliers adopt fewer hard coercive 
strategies and instead employ more promises and non-coercive strategies. When the 
mutual dependence between firms decreases, however, the more dominant company 
will start to use coercive strategies more frequently than non-coercive strategies (Lai, 
2007). 
 
As such, we hypothesised that:  
 
H5. Mutual dependence decreases the effects of coercive strategies on supplier 
delivery flexibility. 
 
Previous studies have claimed that with higher degrees of interdependence between 
the buyer and supplier, suppliers are more likely to adopt non-coercive influence 
strategies (Dwyer & Walker, 1981; Frazier & Rody, 1991; Frazier & Summers, 1986; 
Lai, 2008; Roering, 1977). Chang and Huang (2012) found that when the relationship 
contains a highly shared vision, similar to what can be expected in a higher level of 
mutual dependence between supplier and buyer, using recommendations promotes 
delivery flexibility.  
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Figure 1: Power 
map of potential 
buyer-supplier 
exchange 
relationships 
(Caniëls & 
Gelderman, 2007; 
Caniëls & 
Roeleveld, 2009).  
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Based on this, the following was hypothesised: 
 
H6. Mutual dependence increases the effects of non-coercive strategies on supplier 
delivery flexibility. 
 
Figure 2 displays the conceptual framework of our hypotheses. 
 
 
 
  
Coercive 
strategies  
Power 
 
Supplier 
delivery 
flexibility 
 
H4 H3 
H1 
Non-
coercive 
Interdependence 
 
H2 
H6 H5 
Fig. 2. Conceptual framework. 
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3 Methodology 
 
3.1 Research design  
In the current study, we were interested in examining the general impact that power 
positions have on the effectiveness of buyer influence strategies on supplier delivery 
flexibility. A review of the literature revealed an extensive number of variables that 
may serve as moderators, from which the hypotheses were made (see H1–6). To test 
these hypotheses, and to increase the statistical power and reliability of our findings, 
we required a large population size. For this reason, a survey was employed as a 
data collection method.  
 
3.2 Data collection  
Initially, four surveys were constructed and used, as follows:  
 
The survey was pre-tested in February, by sending it to a randomly selected 
purchase manager and a randomly selected sales manager. After completing the 
questionnaire, the respondents were contacted for feedback on the questionnaire’s 
clarity and completion time. 
 
The survey was conducted during March– May, 2014, and sent to approximately 600 
members of the KIVI Engineering Society. The approached members were registered 
with the Commercial Engineers group, and so represented a high percentage of 
purchase managers and sales managers, as well as project managers with a 
commercial background. The first approach to participate in the survey was made by 
email, sent by KIVI on March 10, which was followed up by a reminder email three 
weeks later. The online survey was made using  and provided respondents with an 
option to submit their data anonymously and to ask for feedback about the results of 
the study.  
 
The email included a letter attachment in which a link to the survey was provided. 
The link was integrated so that when respondents clicked on it the website opened 
automatically and the relevant questionnaire was launched. In total, four different 
versions of questionnaire were created (see Appendices F–I):  
1. Purchase professional in English 
2. Sales professional in English 
3. Inkoop professional (i.e., purchase professional) in Dutch 
4. Verkoop professional (i.e., sales professional) in Dutch  
 
Separate accounts were made on the website for each of the four questionnaires. In 
the questionnaire, respondents were asked to consider the relationship they had with 
one of their main suppliers (or buyers, as applicable) and to select their level of 
agreement with a range of statements regarding this relationship.  
 
The survey also contained demographic items, such as age, gender, current job 
position, and level of education. The respondent was also asked to report general 
information about the organisation(s), such as their company’s size.  
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After a few weeks, it was clear that the English version of the questionnaire was only 
accessed a few times—the Dutch version was preferred. Apparently respondents 
from the KIVI Engineering Society were able to complete the Dutch version despite 
working abroad. A total of 55 usable responses were obtained for an overall 
response rate of 9.2%. 
 
In addition to KIVI, the Purchase Organisation NEVI—the third largest purchase 
society of the world, according their website—was also contacted via phone and 
email to request access to their member database in order to distribute the 
questionnaire. The NEVI advised, however, that due to a large number of similar 
requests they were not willing to distribute the questionnaire. As an alternative, the 
NEVI offered the opportunity to use their Twitter account to send a request to 
participate via text message. In addition, it should have been possible to use the 
NEVI website and newsletter (distributed on the first of each month) to place a 
recruitment advertisement. The NEVI was contacted regarding this opportunity; 
however, no response was received from their website.  
 
Furthermore, the FME, based in Zoetermeer, was contacted by phone and email for 
assistance in distributing the questionnaire. With 2,400 companies in the Dutch 
technology industry as members, representing a turnover totalling € 60 billion, the 
FME would have been a good participant source. However, upon contacting FME, it 
was clear that the organisation does not have a policy which supports research 
students of the Open University or similar institutions.  
 
3.3 Operationalisation 
Closely following the procedures of previous studies, multiple-item scales were used 
to measure each construct. All items were measured using five-point Likert scales, 
ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The items that were used to 
assess the construct variables and their internal consistency are reported in the 
Appendix. 
 
To construct the measures, we made translations of statements which had been 
used in previous research. For instance, the items used to measure delivery flexibility 
were adopted from Sawhney (2006), while the items measuring Promises, Threats, 
Legalistic pleas, Requests, and Recommendations were based on Boyle, Dwyer, 
Robicheaux, and Simpson (1992). Finally, the items measuring buyer and supplier 
interdependence were based on Gelderman et al. (2008). These items were selected 
from previously used models (Boyle et al., 1992; Gelderman & van Weele, 2003; 
Sawhney, 2006), as they were deemed relevant to this thesis. However, some 
variables were excluded, as they did not represent the structure of this thesis. The 
variables that were removed included: volume, mix, and new product flexibility, and 
trust. All other forms of flexibility have not been included in this thesis. Trust was 
excluded from the questionnaire, as this variable appears to be more strongly related 
to relationship issues rather than to power position. As explained previously (see 
Chapter 2), power and interdependence are related to each other, and so were 
defined in terms of buyer and supplier dependence (Gronquist & Berges, 2013). 
Based on these inclusion and exclusion criteria, we selected the list of items 
displayed in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Measurement items for the purchase management questionnaire, including 
the statements used in the Dutch version of this questionnaire.  
Version for purchase management.  
Variables Statements in English Stellingen in het Nederlands Bron 
Delivery 
flexibility  
 
The ability to 
change 
planned or 
assumed 
delivery dates 
1.Suppliers are able to make dependable 
delivery promises 
2.Suppliers can deliver its products on 
promised due dates 
3.Suppliers can deliver in smaller lots and 
ship more frequently to replenish our stock 
levels 
4.Suppliers can to move planned delivery 
dates forward to accommodate rush 
orders or special orders 
 
5. Suppliers can meet the accuracy of 
delivery quantities 
1.Uw leveranciers kunnen betrouwbare 
levertijden afgeven 
2. Uw leveranciers leveren op de 
gevraagde leverdatums uit 
3. Uw leveranciers kunnen desgevraagd 
orders afleveren in kleiner 
hoeveelheden en hogere frequentie 
4. Uw leveranciers kunnen orders 
vervroegt leveren om aan uw gewenste 
levertijden van spoedbestellingen 
tegemoet te komen 
5. Uw leveranciers kunnen de 
leverhoeveelheden aanpassen 
(Tullock, 
2002) 
Promises 
 
The source 
provides 
specific 
rewards if the 
target 
conforms to 
the source’s 
stated desires 
 
1. We make promises to give something 
back in return for specific actions of 
suppliers 
 
2. We provide price premiums or other 
incentives for suppliers’ participation or 
cooperation in product quality 
improvement, new product design, and 
other manufacturing actives 
 
 
3. We offer specific incentives for 
suppliers to make changes in 
manufacturing and/or operating 
procedures 
 
4.We offer more orders for suppliers’ 
meeting cost-down margin or delivery 
quantities 
5.We offer incentives to suppliers when 
they initially had been reluctant to 
cooperate with a new program or policy 
 
 
1. We geven een business partner een 
toezegging dat ze een voordeel kunnen 
behalen als ze een bepaalde wens 
willen invullen 
2.We geven een business partner 
financiële voordelen of voorrechten als 
ze willen samenwerking voor het 
realiseren van een nieuw product, het 
verbeteren van productkwaliteit of 
andere productie gerelateerde 
activiteiten 
3.We geven speciale voordelen aan 
leveranciers indien deze veranderingen 
willen aanbrengen in hun 
productieproces dan wel hun 
procedures 
4.We geven aan meer order te geven 
indien de leverancier de prijzen 
verlaagd dan wel leverhoeveelheden 
5.We geven voordelen aan uw 
leveranciers als deze in eerste instantie 
afwijzend hebben gereageerd op een 
samenwerking ten aanzien van een 
nieuwe voorwaarden of beleid 
(Boyle et al., 
1992)  
Threats 
 
The source 
threatens the 
target with 
future negative 
sanctions if the 
target does not 
comply with a 
request 
1.We make it clear that failing to comply 
with our requests will result in penalties 
against suppliers’ business 
2.We threaten lesser purchase to 
suppliers’ business should they fail to 
agree to our requests 
3. We use threats of disturbing suppliers’ 
business, such as slow payment time for 
supplies, holding payment, and lower pull-
in rates 
 
4. We communicate our ability to make 
“things difficult” for suppliers’ business if 
specific demands are not met 
 
5.We state that specific orders will be 
discontinued for not complying with 
requests 
6.We threaten to reduce the amount of 
business suppliers will do with our firm, 
should our demands not be met 
 
1. We maken onze leveranciers 
duidelijk dat het niet voldoen aan 
verzoeken zal resulteren in sancties 
2. We dreigen minder te bestellen bij 
leveranciers als deze niet ingaan op 
onze verzoeken 
3. We gebruiken dreigementen om de 
verhoudingen in de relatie te verstoren, 
zoals uitstel van betaling, het 
achterhouden van een betaling en een 
lagere leverancierswaardering 
4. We maken onze leveranciers 
duidelijk dat we het vermogen hebben 
om "in te grijpen" als specifieke eisen 
niet worden ingewilligd 
5. We dreigen om specifieke 
opdrachten stop te zetten als niet 
voldoen wordt aan onze verzoeken 
6. We dreigen de hoeveelheid 
leveranciers te verminderen en geven 
daarbij beoordelingscriteria en 
voorwaarden aan voor 
voorkeursleveranciers 
(Boyle et al., 
1992) 
Legalistic 
pleas 
 
The source 
contends that 
the target’s 
compliance is 
1.We refer to portions of purchasing 
agreement which favor our position to gain 
suppliers’ compliance on a particular 
demand 
2.We make a point to refer to any legal 
agreements we have when attempting to 
influence suppliers’ actions 
1. We verwijzen naar delen van het 
contract die ons verzoek ondersteunt en 
die benodigde medewerking van de 
leverancier onderstreept 
2.We verwijzen duidelijk naar juridische 
afspraken die gemaakt zijn om onze 
leveranciers te beïnvloeden 
(Boyle et al., 
1992)  
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required by 
legal contract 
or agreement 
3.We remind suppliers that any of their 
obligations stipulated in purchasing 
agreement 
4.We use sections of our purchasing 
agreement as a “tool” to get suppliers to 
agree to our demands 
 
3.We refereren leveranciers aan hun 
verplichtingen die bepaald zijn in de 
inkoopvoorwaarden 
4.We maken gebruik van delen van 
onze koopovereenkomst als instrument 
om leveranciers te laten instemmen met 
onze eisen 
Requests 
 
The source 
simply asks 
the target to 
act without 
mentioning or 
directly 
implying 
subsequent 
sanctions 
requested or 
rewards 
1. We ask for supplies’ compliance to our 
requests, not indicating any positive or 
negative outcome for their business 
contingent on their compliance 
 
2.We ask suppliers to accept new ideas 
without an explanation of what effect it will 
have on their business 
 
3.We ask suppliers’ cooperation in 
implementing new programs without 
mentioning rewards for complying, or 
punishments for refusing  
4.We expect that our requests do not 
require an incentive for suppliers to 
comply 
1. Wij vragen van onze leveranciers 
instemming met onze verzoeken, 
zonder opgave van de represailles dan 
wel beloning die volgen bij het niet 
inwilligen daarvan 
2.We vragen onze leveranciers om 
onze nieuwe inzichten te accepteren 
zonder enige uitleg over de 
consequenties daarvan op hun merites 
3.Wij verwachten van onze leveranciers 
instemmen op onze nieuwe werkwijze 
zonder dat daar enige beloning tegen 
over staat dan wel sancties 
4.We verwachten van onze leveranciers 
dat men onze verzoeken inwilligt zonder 
gebruikmaking van enige prikkel 
(Boyle et al., 
1992)  
Recommenda
tions 
 
The source 
stresses that 
the target will 
be more 
profitable if the 
target 
achieves 
specific 
desired 
outcomes 
1. We make it clear that by following our 
recommendations, suppliers’ business 
would benefit 
 
2. We make it explicit, when making a 
suggestion, that it is intended for the good 
of suppliers’ operation 
 
3. We provide a clear picture of the 
anticipated positive impact on suppliers’ 
business a recommended course of action 
will have 
4. We outline the logic and/or evidence for 
expecting success from the specific 
programs and actions suggested 
 
1. We maken duidelijk dat door het 
volgen van onze aanbevelingen onze 
leveranciers kunnen profiteren van 
voordelen 
2. We maken het onze leverancier 
expliciet duidelijk dat bij het opvolgen 
van een suggestie, er voordeel te halen 
is voor de leverancier zelf. 
3. Wij geven een duidelijk beeld van de 
te verwachten positieve gevolgen indien 
de leveranciers instemt met een 
aanbevolen actie 
4. We onderstrepen de logica van een 
positief verwachtingspatroon bij het 
volgen van een specifieke aanpak dan 
wel daaraan gelieerde acties 
 (Boyle et al., 
1992) 
 
 
 
Buyer 
dependence 
 
The 
dependence of 
the buyer on 
the supplier for 
his business 
performance 
 
1.To lose our supplier will be associated 
with high various costs 
 
2.Our supplier would be difficult to replace 
 
3.We need the supplier’s expertise 
 
4.We are dependent on our supplier 
 
5. There are more suppliers for this 
product 
1. Bij het verlies van onze leverancier 
zijn hoge uittredingskosten van 
verschillende aard mogelijk 
2. Onze leverancier is moeilijk te 
vervangen 
3. We kunnen niet zonder de expertise 
van de leverancier.  
4. Wij zijn afhankelijk van onze 
leverancier  
5. Er zijn meer leveranciers voor dit 
produkt 
(Gelderman 
& van Weele, 
2003)  
Supplier 
dependence 
 
The 
dependence of 
the supplier on 
the buyer for 
his business 
performance 
 
1. The work we do with this buyer is very 
important to our success  
2. There are few firms that could provide 
us with comparable business to what we 
obtain from this buyer 
3. It would be difficult for us to replace this 
buyer 
4. We are dependent on this buyer 
5. There are more customers for this 
product 
1. Het werk dat we doen met deze klant 
is erg belangrijk voor ons succes 
2. Er zijn maar weinig bedrijven die zo 
belangrijk zijn voor ons als dat wat we 
hebben met deze klant 
3. Het zou moeilijk zijn voor ons om 
deze klant te vervangen 
4. We zijn afhankelijk van deze klant 
5. Er zijn meer afnemers voor dit 
produkt 
 (Gelderman 
& van Weele, 
2003) 
 
 
In total, four versions of the questionnaire were developed to reflect both sides of the 
supply chain (i.e., buyers versus suppliers, in English and Dutch); that is, the 
questionnaires needed to be tailored to the respondent’s point of view.  
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3.4 Data analysis 
Given that two items were reverse-scaled, responses to these items had to be 
reverse-scored prior to conducting a factor analysis on the data. After recoding the 
variables involved, the data were analysed using a number of tools and techniques 
following the three concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data display, and 
conclusion drawing/verification (Munson, Young, & Okiishi, 1990). A data reduction 
method was selected, since the research design included a framework/classification 
of delivery flexibility, influence strategies, and power position.  
 
3.5 Methodological issues 
A factor analysis was performed as a data reduction technique, leaving a smaller set 
of factors or components. In particular, the analysis examined the data for groups 
among the intercorrelations between a set of variables. The measurement of power 
needed to be operationalised using Pfeffer’s (1981) definition of power, which states 
that the relative power of one organisation over another is the result of the net 
dependence of one organisation on the other. That is, the relative power between a 
buyer and supplier is calculated using the difference between their levels of 
dependence. Following this approach, the relative power position of the buyer was 
calculated by subtracting the supplier’s dependence from the buyer’s for each of the 
constructs; thus, a positive value for this measure indicates buyer dominance, while a 
negative value indicates supplier dominance. Similarly, the measure of 
interdependence was calculated using the buyer’s dependence and the supplier’s 
dependence. As indicated previously, total interdependence in a relationship was 
measured by the sum of the parties’ dependence on one another. Therefore, the new 
construct Interdependence was calculated by summing the buyer’s dependence and 
the supplier’s dependence.  
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4 Results 
4.1 The sample 
The total response number for the survey was 55. As the survey was distributed to 
600 potential respondents, the effective response rate was 9,2%. This response rate 
was lower than expected, when compared with previous research into delivery 
flexibility and power, and occurred despite distributing the questionnaire throughout a 
large and well known Dutch engineering society. A possible reason for the low 
response rate could be that there is currently a high volume of such questionnaires, 
due to more intensive marketing efforts via social media. Another possible reason 
could be that there is a greater demand for managers to keep up with the emerging 
social media, as this could have an impact on the time normally available to 
participate in questionnaires. Furthermore, not having included an incentive to 
participate, like the ability to win a prize, etc., could have resulted in a lower-than-
expected response rate (Mizes, Fleece, & Roos, 1984). 
 
The questionnaires were completed by 51 males and three females (n = 1 unknown 
gender). Almost half of the respondents (n = 25) were aged between 45 and 54 
years, three reported to be younger than 35 years, and one respondent reported an 
age of 0 years. The second largest proportion of respondents were aged between 35 
and 44 years (n = 14), while 10 respondents were in the 55–64 year age group. 
Finally, two seniors, aged 65 years or older, completed the questionnaire.  
 
The distribution of the positions held by the sample was: six employees 
(medewerkers); 28 heads of purchasing or sales departments (leider 
inkoop/verkoop); five project managers; and 16 directors/owners (directeur/eigenaar).  
 
In terms of the reported company sizes, most respondents (n = 19) came from 
companies of more than 250 employees, followed by 2–20 employees (n = 14). The 
third largest group of respondents were from companies containing 51–250 
employees (n = 12), while the remaining respondents were from company sizes of 
21–50 (n = 6) and one-man businesses (eenmanszaak; n = 4).  
 
With regard to the education level of the respondents, 17 people had a master’s 
degree (universiteit), 36 respondents had a bachelor’s degree, and two respondents 
had secondary vocational education. 
 
4.2 Reliability of constructs 
A reliability analysis using Cronbach’s alpha was performed to ensure the internal 
consistency of the items that constituted each construct (see Appendix C). The 
coefficients of Cronbach’s alpha were all higher than 0.60, indicating that the 
constructs had acceptable levels of internal consistency and reliability. Additional 
correlation analyses showed that the items which should be related were correlated, 
indicating good convergent validity. Using a factor analysis, the Rotated Component 
Matrix revealed that two (of 53) items had to be removed, as they did not correlate 
well with the other higher values in the component. The factor solutions confirmed the 
intended factor structure; that is, the resulting components were clearly related to the 
items which were supposed to constitute the corresponding constructs. The items 
that should have been related were, indeed, strongly correlated (convergent validity), 
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and the items that should not have been related did not correlate (discriminant 
validity). After doing this, the result of the factor analysis summarised the main 
constructs as: Delivery flexibility, Promises, Threats, Legalistic pleas, Requests, 
Recommendations, Buyer dependence, Supplier dependence, Power, and 
Interdependence.  
 
4.2 Direct effects of the coercive and non-coercive strategies 
As outlined in the introduction (see Chapter 2), influence strategies can be divided 
into coercive and non-coercive types (Joshi & Arnold, 1997), where coercive types 
are more direct (Frazier & Summers, 1984). We used multiple linear regression 
analyses to examine whether the use of coercive strategies by a buyer has a positive 
impact on supplier delivery flexibility (H1) and whether the use of non-coercive 
strategies by a buyer will have a positive impact on the supplier delivery flexibility 
(H2). Specifically, we looked for the direct effects of coercive (Promises, Threats, and 
Legalistic Pleas) and non-coercive strategies (Requests and Recommendations) on 
supplier delivery flexibility. When considering coercive strategies, the findings were 
not statistically significant for the constructs promises (p = ,521) and legalistic pleas 
(p = ,409), and they were marginally significant for the construct threats (p = ,067). 
Overall, the construct Coercive strategies was non-significant (p = ,216), and so 
hypothesis H1 was not supported. With regard to the direct effect of non-coercive 
strategies on delivery flexibility (H2), there was no significant impact of Requests (p = 
,865) or Recommendations (p = ,364); thus no support was found for this hypothesis. 
Similarly, the overall construct Non- coercive strategies was statistically non-
significant (p = ,784), which confirmed this finding. Hence, neither hypothesis (H1 nor 
H2) was supported by this research.  
 
4.3 The moderating effects of power and interdependence 
For hypotheses H3–H6 we predicted an influence of the power position and 
interdependence of buyers and suppliers on the effectiveness of the influence 
strategies used. Thus, we were looking for any effects of power and interdependence 
as moderators on delivery flexibility. For this purpose, we needed to centralise the 
constructs: ThreatsCentr, PowerCentr, PromisesCentr, LegalPlCentr, RecomCentr, 
PowerCentr, and InterdepCentr. The next step was to develop a predictor variable 
based on the newly centralised constructs in SPSS: Threats_Power, 
Promises_Power, LegalPl_Power, Recom_Power, Interdep_Power , 
Threats_Interdependence, Promises_ Interdependence, LegalPl_ Interdependence, 
Recom_ Interdependence, and Interdep_ Interdependence. Following this procedure, 
we applied a linear regression analysis to examine the effects of power and 
interdependence on the effects of coercive and non-coercive influence strategies on 
delivery flexibility.  
 
We found partial support for increased effects of coercive strategies on supplier 
delivery flexibility when the buyer holds a dominant power position (H3). When 
examining each of the coercive strategies, Promises was found to be significant (p = 
,012), supporting the hypothesis. However, the remaining coercive strategies, 
Threats (p = ,807) and Legalistic pleas (p = ,638), were found to be statistically non-
significant .  
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No support was found for a dominant power position of the buyer increasing the 
effects of non-coercive strategies on supplier delivery flexibility (H4), as the non-
coercive constructs Request (p = ,899) and Recommendations (p = ,948) did not 
reach statistical significance.  
 
With respect to whether mutual dependence reduces the effects of coercive 
strategies on supplier delivery flexibility (H5), the results were non-significant for the 
constructs Threats (p = ,300) and Legalistic pleas (p = ,737), but we found marginal 
significance for Promises (p = ,51).  
 
Similarly, the hypothesis that mutual dependence enhances the effects of non-
coercive strategies on supplier delivery flexibility (H6) was not supported, as 
Requests (p = ,840) and Recommendations (p = ,763) were statistically non-
significant.  
 
Table 2. Regression analysis with Threats and Power 
 
Independent variables  Model 1 
(centralised) Beta 
 
Direct effects 
- Threats ,246 (,136) 
Control variables 
- Power ,066 (,597) 
Interactions 
- Threats_Power -,026 (,805) 
Intercept. 3,986*** (,000) 
Adjusted R2 ,058 
∆R2 ,002  
F value 1,041 
N 55 
 
Notes: Unstandardised coefficients are reported; independent 
variables were centred; p values are reported between 
parentheses: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0,001 
 
The results show that when more threats are used, delivery flexibility tends to 
increase (see Table 2); however, note that the relationship is not significant (p = 
,136). In addition, a higher power position tends to increase delivery flexibility; 
however, this relationship was also statistically non-significant (p = ,597).  
Finally, when examining the interaction, with an increasing number of threats, power 
has a negative impact on delivery flexibility. This means that when more threats are 
made, the less important power is on delivery flexibility.  
 
Table 3. Regression analysis with Threats and Interdependence 
 
Independent variables  Model 1 
(centralised) Beta 
 
Direct effects 
- Threats ,186 (,114) 
Control variables 
- Interdependence -,052 (,547) 
Interactions 
- Threats_Interdependence -,085 (,300) 
Intercept. 4,053*** (,000) 
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Adjusted R2 ,082 
R2 ,028  
∆F value 1,528 
N 55 
 
Notes: Unstandardised coefficients are reported; independent 
variables were centred; p values are reported between 
parentheses: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0,001 
 
The results in Table 3 show that when more threats are used, delivery flexibility 
increases; however, note that this relationship is non-significant (p = ,114). 
Furthermore, with greater interdependence between the buyer and supplier, delivery 
flexibility is reduced. Again, however, note that this relationship is not statistically 
significant (p = ,547). Finally, when examining the interaction, with an increasing 
number of threats, the relationship between interdependence and delivery flexibility is 
negative. That is, the more that threats are used, the less important interdependence 
is for delivery flexibility.  
 
 
Table 4. Regression analysis with Promises and Power 
 
Independent variables  Model 1 
(centralised) Beta 
 
Direct effects 
- Promises -,050 (,665) 
Control variables 
- Power -,102 (,477) 
Interactions 
- Promises_Power ,225* (,012) 
Intercept. 4,137*** (,000) 
Adjusted R2 ,131 
∆R2 ,080  
F value 2,555 
N 55 
 
Notes: Unstandardised coefficients are reported; independent 
variables were centred; p values are reported between 
parentheses: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0,001 
 
It was found that when more promises are used, delivery flexibility decreases (see 
Table 4). Note that this relationship is not significant (p = ,477). In addition, increased 
power appears to reduce delivery flexibility; however, this relationship is not 
significant (p = ,665). Finally, the significant interaction between Promises and Power 
shows that when there are a high number of promises, power has a greater impact 
on delivery flexibility. This means that when more promises are used, power has a 
positive impact on delivery flexibility.  
 
Table 5. Regression analysis with Promises and Interdependence 
 
Independent variables  Model 1 
(centralised) Beta 
 
Direct effects 
- Promises ,126 (,291) 
Control variables 
- Interdenpendency -,090 (,287) 
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Interactions 
- Promises_Interdependence ,184t (,051) 
Intercept. 4,035*** (,000) 
Adjusted R2 ,101 
∆R2 ,048 
F value 1,910 
N 55 
 
Notes: Unstandardised coefficients are reported; independent 
variables were centred; p values are reported between 
parentheses: tp<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0,001 
 
The results in Table 5 show that when more promises are used, delivery flexibility 
increases. Note that this relationship is not significant, however (p = ,291). 
Conversely, with increased interdependence, delivery flexibility decreases; this 
relationship is, however, not significant (p = ,287). Finally, the interaction shows that 
with a higher number of promises, increased interdependence improves delivery 
flexibility. This interaction is marginally significant (p = ,051). 
 
Table 6. Regression analysis with Legalistic pleas and Power 
 
Independent variables  Model 1 
(centralised) Beta 
 
Direct effects 
- Legalistic pleas ,032 (,812) 
Control variables 
- Power -,023 (,854) 
Interactions 
- Legalistic pleas _Power -,047 (,638) 
Intercept. 4,081*** (,000) 
Adjusted R2 ,067 
∆R2 -,054  
F value 0,076 
N 55 
 
Notes: Unstandardised coefficients are reported; independent 
variables were centred; p values are reported between 
parentheses: tp<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0,001 
 
The results show that if more legalistic pleas are used, delivery flexibility increases; 
however, note that this relationship is not significant (p = ,812; see Table 6). In 
contrast, increases in power appear to reduce delivery flexibility; again, however, this 
relationship is not significant (p = ,854). Finally, as can been seen in the interaction, 
with a higher number of legalistic pleas, increased levels of power reduces delivery 
flexibility.  
 
Table 7. Regression analysis with Legalistic pleas and Interdependence 
 
Independent variables  Model 1 
(centralised) Beta 
 
Direct effects 
- Legalistic pleas ,020 (,865) 
Control variables 
- Interdenpendency -,073 (,416) 
Interactions 
- Legalistic pleas _Interdependence ,026 (,737) 
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Intercept. 4,049 *** (,000) 
Adjusted R2 ,126 
∆R2 -,042 
F value ,272 
N 55 
 
Notes: Unstandardised coefficients are reported; independent 
variables were centred; p values are reported between 
parentheses: tp<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0,001 
 
The results in Table 7 show that if more legalistic pleas are used, delivery flexibility 
increases. Note that this relationship is not significant (p = ,865). However, when 
there is more interdependence between the buyer and the supplier delivery flexibility 
decreases. This relationship is also not significant (p = ,416). Finally, as shown by the 
interaction, with higher numbers of legalistic pleas, increased interdependence 
between buyer and supplier increases delivery flexibility.  
 
Table 8. Regression analysis with Requests and Power 
 
Independent variables  Model 1 
(centralised) Beta 
 
Direct effects 
- Requests ,042 (,786) 
Control variables 
- Power -,015 (,902) 
Interactions 
- Requests_Power -,014 (,899) 
Intercept. 4,070*** (,000) 
Adjusted R2 ,002 
∆R2 -,057  
F value 0,026 
N 55 
 
Notes: Unstandardised coefficients are reported; independent 
variables were centred; p values are reported between 
parentheses: tp<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0,001 
 
As shown in Table 8, if more requests are used, delivery flexibility increases. Note, 
however, that this relationship is not significant (p = ,786). Conversely, increases in 
power appear to reduce delivery flexibility, although this relationship is not significant 
(p = ,902). Finally, the interaction between requests and power suggest that with a 
high number of requests, increased levels of power reduce delivery flexibility.  
 
Table 9. Regression analysis with Requests and Interdependence 
 
Independent variables  Model 1 
(centralised) Beta 
 
Direct effects 
- requests ,027 (,840) 
Control variables 
- Interdenpendency -,074 (,404) 
Interactions 
- Requests _Interdependence ,022 (,840) 
Intercept. 4,055*** (,000) 
Adjusted R2 ,126 
∆R2 -,042 
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F value ,272 
N 55 
 
Notes: Unstandardised coefficients are reported; independent 
variables were centred; p values are reported between 
parentheses: tp<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0,001 
 
The results displayed in Table 9 show that if more requests are used, delivery 
flexibility increases. Note that this relationship is not significant (p = ,840). However, 
when there is greater interdependence between the companies, delivery flexibility 
decreases. The relationship is, however, not statistically significant (p = ,404). Finally, 
the interaction suggests that with an increased number of requests, the correlation 
between interdependence and delivery flexibility will be positive. This means that the 
more that requests exploit the target, the more important interdependence will be to 
get delivery flexibility.  
 
Table 10. Regression analysis with Recommendations and Power 
 
Independent variables  Model 1 
(centralised) Beta 
 
Direct effects 
- Recommendations ,140 (,245) 
Control variables 
- Power ,028 (,816) 
Interactions 
- Recommendations_Power ,006 (,948) 
Intercept. 4,029*** (,000) 
Adjusted R2 ,027 
∆R2 -,031  
F value 0,463 
N 55 
 
Notes: Unstandardised coefficients are reported; independent 
variables were centred; p values are reported between 
parentheses: tp<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0,001 
 
The results show that if more recommendations are used, delivery flexibility 
increases; however, note that this relationship is not significant (p = ,245; see Table 
10). Similarly, increased levels of power increases delivery flexibility; however, this 
relationship is not significant (p = ,816). Finally, the interaction shows that with higher 
numbers of recommendations, higher levels of power increase delivery flexibility. This 
means that the more that recommendations exploit the target, the more important 
power will be for improving delivery flexibility.  
 
Table 11. Regression analysis with Recommendations and Interdependence 
 
Independent variables  Model 1 
(centralised) Beta 
 
Direct effects 
- Recommendations ,151 (,197) 
Control variables 
- Interdenpendency -,090 (,308) 
Interactions 
- Recommendations_Interdependence ,033 (,763) 
Intercept. 4,055*** (,000) 
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Adjusted R2 ,046 
∆R2 -,010 
F value ,862 
N 55 
 
Notes: Unstandardised coefficients are reported; independent 
variables were centred; p values are reported between 
parentheses: tp<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0,001 
 
Finally, the results in Table 11 show that if more recommendations are used, delivery 
flexibility will increase (however, this relationship is not significant, p = ,197). In 
addition, with more interdependence, delivery flexibility decreases; however, this 
relationship is not significant (p = ,308). The interaction suggests that with greater 
numbers of recommendations, increased interdependence improves delivery 
flexibility. This means that the more that recommendations exploit the target, the 
more important interdependence will be to obtain delivery flexibility.  
 
4.4 Correlation analysis 
Multiple exploratory analyses have revealed new findings in this field. Via our data 
analyses, we have observed some significant correlations between several variables. 
For example, a positive correlation was found between the coercive influence 
strategy legalistic pleas and the non-coercive influence strategy of requests (0,47). In 
addition, a positive correlation was found between the coercive influence strategy 
legalistic pleas and the non-coercive influence strategy recommendations (0,46). A 
negative correlation was found between the construct power—the difference between 
the buyer’s and the supplier’s dependence—and the coercive influence strategy 
threats (-0,37). This indicates that the more power a buyer has, the less they will use 
threats to gain the compliance of the supplier. Finally, a positive relationship was 
found between supplier dependence and the non-coercive influence strategy 
recommendations (0,28). This indicates that the more dependent a supplier is on the 
buyer, the more recommendations they use.  
 
Table 12. Correlation matrix of constructs with means and deviation. 
 
 DLV THT  LP  PR  RQ  REM  BD SD PWR  DEP 
 
DLV  1.00 
THT  ,224  1.00 
LP  -,004  ,239  1.00 
PR  ,122 ,011  -,236  1.00 
RQ  ,032 ,217  ,470**  −0,205  1.00 
REM  ,160  ,216  ,463**  ,154  ,201 1.00 
BD -,091 -,217 ,191 -,037 ,073 -,036 1.00 
SD -,096 ,225 ,052 ,190 -,094 ,280* ,287 1.00 
PWR  -,009 -,368* ,133 -,178 ,137 -,246 ,684** -,503** 1.00 
DEP -,116 -,018 ,159 ,083 -,004 ,135 ,838** ,763** ,175 1.00 
Mean  4,0545 2,7121 3,5273 2,5879 3,4591 3,0045 2,7527 2,8518 -,0991 5,6045 
Standard deviation  -,84892 ,96003 ,98521 1,04491 ,89593 1,01663 ,91000 ,76781 1,00851 1,34840 
 
Notes: DLV = delivery flexibility; THT = threats; LP = legal pleas; PR = promises; RQ = requests; REM = 
recommendations; BD= Buyer dependence; SD= supplier dependence; PWR = Power; DEP = Interdependence 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
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4.5 Comparing purchasing and sales professionals 
An independent samples t-test was performed to compare the use of influence 
strategies by purchasing (inkoop; buyers) and sales (verkoop; suppliers) 
professionals. The results revealed that buyers (M = 3,97) used this coercive 
influence strategy more extensively than suppliers (M = 3,19; p = ,05). However, no 
differences were found between buyers and suppliers when examining the remaining 
constructs.  
 
When examining responses to specific items, more significant differences were found 
between buyers and suppliers. Regarding the use of promises, a significant 
difference was found in response to the situation of “More orders for lower margin or 
delivery quantities” (Item 4). In particular, purchasers believed that more orders were 
sent as a result of compliance to promises, when compared with buyers (p = ,012). 
When considering the items related to the perceived use of legalistic pleas, a great 
number of significant differences were found between buyers and sellers. With 
respect to the first item of this construct, “Refer to portions of the purchasing agreement”, 
a significant difference was found between purchase (M = 4,46) and sales (M = 3,48) 
professionals (p = ,01), indicating that purchasers put a higher value on this coercive 
strategy than sales professionals. In response to the second item of Legalistic pleas, 
“Refer to any legal agreements”, we found a significant difference between purchase (M 
= 3,50) and sales professionals (M = 2,71; p = ,024), indicating the same 
phenomenon. A similar pattern of results emerged for the following items of this 
construct (Item 3 “Remind suppliers of their obligations” and Item 4 “Sections of our 
purchasing agreement”). In particular, purchase professionals (M = 4,17) had higher 
perceptions than sales professionals (M = 3,48) of the extent to which suppliers were 
reminded of their obligations (Item 3; p = ,023). Similarly, purchase professionals (M 
= 3,75) had higher perceptions than sales professionals (M = 3,06) with respect to 
the extent to which sections of the purchasing agreements were used (Item 3; p = 
,043).  
 
For the variable “Difficult to replace“ (i.e., from the dependence construct) we obtained 
a significant difference between purchasers (M = 3,50) and sellers (M = 2,65; p = 
,013), indicating that purchase professionals feel that the supplier is relatively more 
difficult to replace. For the variable “Costly to lose”, a significant difference was found 
between buyers (M = 3,50) and sellers (M = 4,19), whereby the perceived worth of 
the buying party is higher for the supplier than vice versa (p = ,019). Finally, a 
significant difference was found for “We are dependent” (p = ,010) between buyers 
(M = 3,58) and sellers (M = 4,42), indicating a relatively greater dependence of 
suppliers on their buyers.  
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5 Conclusions, discussion, and recommendations 
5.1 Conclusions 
Influence strategies are routinely used in business. There is, however, a gap in the 
literature regarding the effects of power position on these influence strategies. How 
much more effective can influence strategies be if the power position of the buyer is 
high? What effect will it have on the delivery flexibility of the supplier? The current 
research aimed to answer these questions. None of our hypotheses were confirmed, 
which is an interesting result in itself. The inconsistency between our findings and 
those of previous studies could be due to differences in the sample characteristics 
and measures used here. Looking at the data, it is clear that the number of 
responses is not large. It should also be noted that responses were gathered from 
different sides of the value chain; that is, suppliers are looking for sales, and so are 
“on the hunt” for more orders. This need could bring about more opportunistic 
behaviours, which could influence the results obtained from the sales side. However, 
the findings did not confirm this. That is, the buyer should (more or less) protect the 
processes of their own factory.  
 
5.2 Discussion 
The current research focussed on the effectiveness of influence strategies on 
supplier delivery flexibility with power and interdependence as moderating factors. In 
the current research, the direct effects of influence strategies on delivery flexibility 
were not supported. Neither coercive nor non-coercive strategies appear to make the 
supplier more compliant. Across the different influence strategies, the effect of threats 
on delivery flexibility approached significance (p = .067). When power was included 
as a moderator for threats, a negative relationship emerged, whereby delivery 
flexibility is reduced when threats are used by more powerful companies. Another 
conclusion could be that less powerful companies will obtain greater delivery 
flexibility if they use threats.  
 
In contrast, the level of interdependence between buyers and suppliers does not 
have an impact on the effect of threats. One reason for this can be found in the 
noneconomic satisfaction of major channel members, because they are unwilling to 
be involved with partners who use coercion (Lai, 2007). Furthermore, (Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, & Kumar, 1999) provide support for this idea by reporting that a channel 
member who feels socio-psychologically satisfied “appreciates the contacts with its 
partner and, on a personal level, likes working with it, because it believes the partner 
is concerned, respectful and willing to exchange ideas.” The use of threats is clearly 
not in line with such an ethic, which would explain the negative relationship observed 
for more powerful companies using this strategy (Interaction Threats_Power -,026; p 
= ,805). While a (compliant) reaction of the supplier could be seen as a short-term 
success for the buyer, any advantage of using this coercive strategy will be lost if it is 
used frequently (Payan, 2006). It is likely to assume that this experience is 
associated with more mature, and so more powerful, companies. However, the use of 
threats is likely to harm the relationship between buyer and supplier (Boyle & Dwyer, 
1995; Raven, 1992).  
 
When considering the moderating effects of interdependence, it is observed that 
promises have a significant impact on the delivery flexibility. This finding confirms 
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those of previous research into the effect of promises becoming stronger as the 
interdependence between buyer and supplier increases (Lai, 2007). In the current 
research, Promises was classified as a coercive strategy, whereby compliance of the 
supplier is expected. With interdependence as a moderator, there was a marginally 
significant effect of Promises. This indicates that when the cooperation between 
companies is strong (Gronquist & Berges, 2013), promises will enhance delivery 
flexibility. This could be because both companies have invested heavily in the 
relationship using trust and commitment (Conley, 2008), and promises could serve as 
a guide or signal that this mutual cooperation could be taken to an even higher level. 
New opportunities may arise if compliance is shown in response to a promise.  
 
However, previous studies have demonstrated that coercive influence strategies can 
have negative effects on dyadic relationships (Kumar et al., 1998; Venkatesh, Kohli, 
& Zaltman, 1995)—a finding which could be seen as being inconsistent with that of 
the current study, where promises were found to have a positive impact. It is 
important to note that in the current study, influence strategies were divided into 
categories in terms of their coercive intensity. These categories included hard 
coercive influence strategies (i.e., threats and legalistic pleas), soft coercive 
strategies (i.e., recommendations and promises), and non-coercive strategies (i.e., 
requests and information exchange). Thus, this research highlights the likelihood that 
promises are received as a softer coercion strategy and so are better accepted. 
Support for this explanation can be found at the variable level: In response to “More 
orders for lower margin or delivery quantities” (Promises; Item 4), we observed a 
higher mean for purchasers (cf. suppliers), indicating that they believe they use 
promises to increase orders more frequently than is experienced by the supplier (p = 
,012). That is, it seems that the supplier does not recognise the use of promises at 
such a high level. Therefore, it is possible that the value of promises is misjudged 
during several phases of the delivery process.  
 
During the exploratory analyses, we found correlations between several constructs. 
For instance, Legalistic pleas correlated with both Requests and Recommendations, 
whereby a more frequent use of legalistic pleas was associated with a more frequent 
use of recommendations and requests. While Legalistic pleas was classified as a 
coercive strategy, Requests and Recommendations were not. By using legalistic 
pleas, the source reminds the target of agreements that have been made and which 
were confirmed (mutually) during the deal settlement. Although this is a coercive 
strategy, it is in fact simply reminding both parties of the contract, and so refreshing 
agreements made previously. Legalistic pleas are backed up by laws and 
regulations, and thus are more transparent than threats. As such, the effect of 
legalistic pleas on the relationship may be more secure (i.e., than threats). The 
construct Power—the difference between the buyer’s dependence and the supplier’s 
dependence—and the coercive influence strategy Threats were found to be 
negatively correlated (-0,37), which indicates that the more power a buyer has, the 
less they will use threats to gain the supplier’s compliance. This is consistent with 
previous research (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010; Lai, 2007). 
Finally, the construct Supplier dependence and the non-coercive influence strategy 
Recommendations were positively correlated (0,28). This indicates that with a higher 
level of dependence between supplier and buyer, the more often recommendations 
are made/exchanged. Recommendations is a non-coercive influence strategy, and so 
this finding is in line with previous research showing that non-coercive influence 
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strategies are more effective (cf. coercive strategies) in relationships with higher 
levels of cooperation (Lobanoff & Ross, 1992). 
 
Between buyers and suppliers, a significant difference was observed for the use of 
legalistic pleas. Legalistic pleas refer to previously made agreements, and so a 
buyer’s attempt to increase delivery flexibility using legalistic pleas puts pressure on 
the supplier. This can happen in cases where the supplier has informed the buyer of 
non-compliance with the requested delivery time. The buyer might then remind the 
supplier of their contract. This is often seen, as suppliers are also dependent on 
components or expertise from others in order to produce the goods. Consequently, if 
there are unforeseen setbacks or miscalculations in the delivery of these components 
or knowledge to the supplier, the supplier shall have to inform the buyer about the 
delay.  
 
More significant results were obtained for the construct Legalistic pleas. For example, 
when considering referrals to portions of the purchasing agreement (Item 1), a 
significantly higher mean was reported for purchasers (cf. sales professionals; p = 
,01). This indicates that purchasers feel that they refer to legal agreements more 
often than is interpreted by the suppliers, which suggests that purchasers place a 
relatively higher value on this coercive strategy. A similar pattern of results was 
observed with respect to referring to legal agreements (Item 2), and reminding 
suppliers of their obligations (Item 3), and sections of purchasing agreements (Item 
4). In general, legalistic pleas appear to have less impact on suppliers than is 
assumed by the purchasers. This indicates that legalistic pleas are not a hard 
coercive influence strategy, as is assumed by the users (purchasers). A reason for 
this difference between buyers’ and suppliers’ perceptions of legalistic pleas could be 
that legalistic pleas are, in fact, just a reaction to the non-compliance of the supplier 
to a previously defined obligation, and so this reaction could be expected by the 
supplier. In contrast, threats are not expected, because the obligations were not 
agreed upon in a previous negotiation. Given these findings, the classification of 
legalistic pleas as a soft (cf. hard) coercive strategy seems plausible.  
 
Differences between buyers and sellers were also observed for other constructs. 
Interestingly, suppliers had a lower estimation of their power position compared with 
buyers, as evidenced by their response to the variable “Difficult to replace” (M = 3,50 
for buyers and M = 2,65 for sellers). This indicates that purchase professionals feel 
that the supplier is more difficult to replace, which could colour the power position in 
the supply chain in an unexpected way. The reason that the purchasers could judge 
the difficulty in substitutability to be higher is that their processes have been 
developed using the product of the supplier, thus any change could lead to a higher 
risk for the purchaser. In contrast, opposite findings were obtained for the variable 
“Costly to lose”, as suppliers believed that their buyer’s importance was higher than 
the buyers realised (M = 3,50 for buyers and M = 4,19 for sellers; p = ,019). The final 
significant difference found between buyers and sellers was in response to “We are 
dependent” (p = ,010), with a lower mean for buyers (M = 3,58) than sellers (M = 
4,42). This means that the feeling of dependence of the suppliers towards the buyers 
is higher (cf. buyers towards suppliers). It is observed that the perception of 
interdependence between buyers and suppliers is on a different level for different 
aspects. Consequently, this could affect the power position that companies feel they 
have.  
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5.3 Recommendations for practitioners 
In the construct of legalistic pleas, new markers can be set regarding their effects on 
the supplier. The use of legalistic pleas, which is a reminder of the terms that were 
previously agreed upon for the purchase, is not interpreted as heavy, inconvenient, 
or rude, as may be expected by the user. This implies that when a purchaser wants 
the effect of the legalistic pleas to be in line with their expectation, the force with 
which the legalistic plea is presented should be stronger. Then the receiver is likely to 
show greater compliance. Similarly, when using legalistic pleas, there should be a 
clear reference to the contract or the law, otherwise there is a risk that the influence 
strategy enters the domain of threats.  
 
In the current research, we have found some new insights regarding the perceptions 
that buyers and suppliers have. These perceptions can colour buyers’ and suppliers’ 
power position and, consequently, have an impact on the level of mutual 
interdependence. It has been observed that, in general, buyers are more concerned 
about the substitutability of the supplier than vice versa.  
 
5.4 Recommendations for future research 
This research has several limitations, which justify further research. Future research 
could be based on a larger dataset in order to improve the reliability of the results. In 
addition, future research could investigate the use of legalistic pleas and the mapping 
of this influence strategy in terms of its coerciveness level.  
 
Furthermore, new insights regarding power and interdependence could be 
considered, as we have seen a discrepancy in the perception of the power position. 
With the use of Porter’s 5-Forces Model (Porter, 1979), new ideas could be 
formulated and investigated about a more precise proposition of the power position, 
and so interdependence. In this study, it has been observed that the perception of 
buyers and suppliers regarding their mutual position is not equal. Future research 
into this topic could lead to important new insights. 
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APPENDIX A Item scales 
 
 
 
Measure (on a five point Likert-scale) 
Factor 
loadings 
Cronbach's 
alpha 
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation
 
Delivery flexibility a 
  
.86 
 
4.06 
 
.85 
* Suppliers are able to make dependable delivery 
promises 
.66    
* Suppliers can deliver its products on promised due 
dates 
.70    
* Suppliers can deliver in smaller lots and ship more 
frequently to replenish our stock levels 
.56    
* Suppliers can to move planned delivery dates 
forward to accommodate rush orders or special orders 
.57    
* Suppliers can meet the accuracy of delivery 
quantities 
.50    
 
Promisesb  
 
 
 
.68 
 
2.59 
 
.96 
* We make promise to give something back in return 
for specific actions of suppliers 
.50    
* We provide price premiums or other incentives for 
suppliers’ participation or cooperation in product 
quality improvement, new product design, and other 
manufacturing actives 
.56    
* We offer specific incentives for suppliers to make 
changes in manufacturing and/or operating 
procedures 
-    
* We offer more orders for suppliers’ meeting cost-
down margin or delivery quantities 
-    
* We offer incentives to suppliers when they initially 
had been reluctant to cooperate with a new program 
or policy  
.69    
 
Threatsb 
  
.85 
 
2.71 
 
.99 
* We make it clear that failing to comply with our 
requests will result in penalties against suppliers’ 
business 
.54    
* We threaten lesser purchase to suppliers’ business 
should they fail to agree to our requests 
.62    
* We use threats of disturbing suppliers’ business, 
such as slow payment time for supplies, holding 
payment, and lower pull-in rates 
.48    
* We communicate our ability to make “things 
difficult” for suppliers’ business if specific demands 
are not met (R) 
.46    
* We state that specific orders will be discontinued .54    
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for not complying with requests 
* We threaten to reduce the amount of business 
suppliers will do with our firm, should our demands 
not be met 
.63    
 
Legalistic pleasb 
  
.88 
 
3.53 
 
1.04 
* We refer to portions of purchasing agreement which 
favor our position to gain suppliers’ compliance on a 
particular demand 
.77    
* We make a point to refer to any legal agreements 
we have when attempting to influence suppliers’ 
actions 
.55    
* We remind suppliers that any of their obligations 
stipulated in purchasing agreement 
.64    
* We use sections of our purchasing agreement as a 
“tool” to get suppliers to agree to our demands 
.67    
 
Requestsb 
  
.78 
 
3.46 
 
0.90 
* We ask for supplies’ compliance to our requests, not 
indicating any positive or negative outcome for their 
business contingent on their compliance 
.45    
* We ask suppliers to accept new ideas without an 
explanation of what effect it will have on their 
business 
.56    
* We ask suppliers’ cooperation in implementing new 
programs without mentioning rewards for complying, 
or punishments for refusing  
.54    
* We expect that our requests do not require an 
incentive for suppliers to comply 
.56    
 
Recommendationsb 
  
.88 
 
3.00 
 
1.02 
* We make it clear that by following our 
recommendations, suppliers’ business would benefit 
.71    
* We make it explicit, when making a suggestion, that 
it is intended for the good of suppliers’ operation 
.59    
* We provide a clear picture of the anticipated 
positive impact on suppliers’ business a 
recommended course of action will have 
.67    
* We outline the logic and/or evidence for expecting 
success from the specific programs and actions 
suggested (R) 
.55    
 
Buyer’s dependencec 
  
.81 
 
2.75 
 
.91 
* Our supplier would be costly to lose. .50    
* Our supplier would be difficult to replace. .52    
* We need the supplier’s expertise (R) .44    
* We are dependent on our supplier. (R) 
* There are more suppliers for this product 
.48 
.47 
   
 
Supplier’s dependencec 
 
 
 
.72 
 
2.85 
 
.76 
37 
 
* Our supplier would find it costly to lose us. (R) .53    
* Our supplier would find it difficult to replace us. .62    
* Our supplier needs our expertise. .64    
* Our supplier is dependent on us. .72    
* We can sell this product to other customers  .38    
Notes: 
a
 based on  (Tullock, 2002) 
b
 based on (Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux, & Simpson, 1992) 
c
 based on (Gelderman, 2003); (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010) 
 (R) indicates item was reverse coded 
- indicates deleted item 
 
 
Dependent delivery flexibility 
Explanatory variables 
 
Unstandardised 
Coefficents 
Standardised 
Coefficents 
t-values p = 
 B Beta   
 
(Constant) 3,264  4,669 ,000 
Promises ,065 ,073 ,490 ,626 
Threats ,184 ,213 1,489 ,143 
LegalPl -,098 -,121 -,673 ,504 
Requests ,025 ,027 ,171 ,865 
Recommendations ,127 ,153 ,936 ,364 
 
Adjusted R2 = - 0.011; F-value = 0.881 , n = 55 
 
  
38 
 
APPENDIX B Frequencies 
Gender 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Male 51 92,7 
Female 3 5,5 
Total 54 98,2 
Missing System 1 1,8 
Total 55 100,0 
Age 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
0 1 1,8 
< 35 years 3 5,5 
35 - 44 years 14 25,5 
45 - 54 years 25 45,5 
55 - 64 years 10 18,2 
> 65 years 2 3,6 
Total 55 100,0 
Position 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Medewerker 6 10,9 
Leider (inkoop/verkoop) 28 50,9 
Project manager 5 9,1 
Directeur/eigenaar 16 29,1 
Total 55 100,0 
Company size 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Eenmanszaak 4 7,3 
tot 20 medewerkers 14 25,5 
21 - 50 medewerkers 6 10,9 
51 - 250 medewerkers 12 21,8 
> 250 medewerkers 19 34,5 
Total 55 100,0 
Education 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
MBO 2 3,6 
HBO 36 65,5 
Universiteit 17 30,9 
Total 55 100,0 
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APPENDIX C Component matrix 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SDF1 - Betrouwbare levertijden ,423 ,478 -,043 ,656 -,016 -,022 ,030 -,122 
DSF2 - Op tijd leveren ,313 ,377 -,083 ,701 -,007 -,166 ,050 -,107 
SDF3 - Kleine q, hoge frequentie ,127 ,559 -,033 ,523 -,184 ,154 -,128 -,035 
SDF4 - Vervroegd leveren ,191 ,568 ,009 ,397 ,103 -,045 -,239 ,240 
SDF5 - Nauwkeurig in q ,332 ,499 -,058 ,500 ,090 ,152 ,307 -,121 
Pro1 - Klant belooft iets in ruil ,102 ,389 ,486 ,120 -,216 ,500 ,095 ,095 
Pro2 - Fin. voordelen bij samenwerking -,103 ,304 ,556 ,003 -,156 ,254 ,164 ,428 
Pro5 - Terughoudend dan voordelen -,233 ,080 ,144 -,152 -,344 ,692 ,083 -,196 
Thr1 - Klant dreigt met sancties ,544 ,418 ,056 -,282 ,115 -,261 -,040 -,108 
Thr2 - Klant bestelt minder ,619 ,256 -,048 -,138 ,393 ,058 -,166 ,281 
Thr3 - Klant betaalt minder ,296 ,484 ,301 -,323 ,319 -,199 ,168 -,018 
Thr4 - Klant maakt het moeilijk ,129 ,353 ,201 -,458 ,445 ,160 ,277 ,085 
Thr5 - Klant dreigt stopzetting ,542 ,424 ,006 -,320 ,298 ,026 ,063 ,245 
Thr6 - Klant dreigt met minder zaken ,634 ,214 -,069 -,189 ,495 -,020 ,035 ,160 
LP1 - Verwijst naar contract ,770 -,292 -,165 ,078 -,122 ,047 ,152 -,136 
LP2 - Verwijst naar juridische deals ,554 -,341 ,043 -,014 ,069 ,025 ,427 -,229 
LP3 - Herinnert aan contract ,640 -,542 -,178 -,032 -,128 -,128 ,178 ,070 
LP4 - Gebruikt contract ,669 -,325 -,258 -,113 -,036 -,056 ,406 -,111 
Req1 - Alleen vraag ,448 -,200 -,230 ,031 ,261 ,404 -,339 -,204 
Req2 - Vraag om acceptatie ,261 ,038 -,287 -,015 ,376 ,555 ,002 -,145 
Req3 - Verwacht samenwerking ,539 -,333 -,354 -,077 -,021 ,335 -,308 ,120 
Req4 - Geen prikkels nodig ,558 -,354 -,392 -,001 ,027 ,067 -,359 ,181 
Recom1 - Beter af ,709 -,043 ,055 -,017 -,362 -,179 -,170 ,112 
Recom2 - Bij opvolgen voordelen ,586 ,000 ,378 -,133 -,522 ,041 -,080 ,031 
Recom3 - Verwachte positieve gevolgen ,670 ,017 ,150 -,097 -,565 -,013 -,122 -,022 
Recom4 - Bewijs voor succes ,442 -,062 ,298 ,048 -,545 -,026 ,063 ,287 
BD1 - Switching costs ,158 -,503 ,344 ,367 ,219 -,049 ,303 ,043 
BD2 - Moeilijk vervangbaar ,155 -,517 ,329 ,522 ,178 ,003 ,082 -,066 
BD3 - Techn. expertise -,079 -,442 ,239 ,265 ,382 ,021 ,081 ,109 
BD4 - Klant is afhankelijk ,054 -,483 ,367 ,466 ,323 ,165 -,026 ,223 
BD5 - Alternatieve leveranciers ,147 ,465 -,391 -,113 -,138 -,038 ,252 -,427 
SD1 - Omzet belangrijke klant ,202 ,098 ,447 -,003 ,023 -,525 -,249 -,218 
SD2 - Switchting costs ,174 ,003 ,620 ,117 ,254 ,026 -,314 -,417 
SD3 - Techn. expertise ,154 -,122 ,642 -,288 -,130 ,102 ,255 -,052 
SD4 - Afhankelijk van klant ,156 -,166 ,723 -,106 ,264 -,091 -,232 -,139 
SD5 - Alternatieve klanten -,153 ,042 -,380 ,271 -,013 -,221 ,302 ,380 
a. 8 components extracted. 
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 Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Supplier delivery flexibility 1 - Betrouwbare levertijden ,907 
Supplier delivery flexibility 2 - Op tijd leveren ,856 
Supplier delivery flexibility 3 - Kleine quantity, hoge frequentie ,751 
Supplier delivery flexibility 4 - Vervroegd leveren ,629 
Supplier delivery flexibility 5 - Nauwkeurig in q ,782 
Promises 1 - Klant belooft iets in ruil ,719 
Promises 2 - Fin. voordelen bij samenwerking ,563 
Promises 5 - Terughoudend dan voordelen ,775 
Thr1 - Klant dreigt met sancties ,580 
Thr2 - Klant bestelt minder ,718 
Thr3 - Klant betaalt minder ,715 
Thr4 - Klant maakt het moeilijk ,723 
Thr5 - Klant dreigt stopzetting ,807 
Thr6 - Klant dreigt met minder zaken ,775 
LP1 - Verwijst naar contract ,627 
LP2 - Verwijst naar juridische deals ,746 
LP3 - Herinnert aan contract ,585 
LP4 - Gebruikt contract ,774 
Req1 - Alleen vraag ,776 
Req2 - Vraag om acceptatie ,593 
Req3 - Verwacht samenwerking ,787 
Req4 - Geen prikkels nodig ,708 
Recom1 - Beter af ,754 
Recom2 - Bij opvolgen voordelen ,804 
Recom3 - Verwachte positieve gevolgen ,815 
Recom4 - Bewijs voor succes ,784 
BD1 - Switching costs ,728 
BD2 - Moeilijk vervangbaar ,729 
BD3 - Techn. expertise ,661 
BD4 - Klant is afhankelijk ,857 
BD5 - Alternatieve leveranciers -,657 
SD1 - Omzet belangrijke klant ,581 
SD2 - Switchting costs ,818 
SD3 - Techn. expertise ,334 
SD4 - Afhankelijk van klant ,695 
SD5 - Alternatieve klanten -,629 
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Inkoop of 
verkoop 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
Mean 
DeliveryFlexibility 
Verkoop 31 4,0129 1,00788 ,18102 
Inkoop 24 4,1083 ,60139 ,12276 
Promises 
Verkoop 31 2,6344 ,83158 ,14936 
Inkoop 24 2,5278 1,12037 ,22869 
Threats 
Verkoop 31 2,7796 ,97789 ,17563 
Inkoop 24 2,6250 1,00872 ,20590 
LegalPleas 
Verkoop 31 3,1855 1,08583 ,19502 
Inkoop 24 3,9688 ,81532 ,16643 
Requests 
Verkoop 31 3,3226 ,90644 ,16280 
Inkoop 24 3,6354 ,86909 ,17740 
Recommendations 
Verkoop 31 2,8387 ,85768 ,15404 
Inkoop 24 3,2188 1,17564 ,23998 
BuyerDependence 
Verkoop 31 2,6452 ,94334 ,16943 
Inkoop 24 2,8917 ,86473 ,17651 
SupplierDependence 
Verkoop 31 2,7871 ,57023 ,10242 
Inkoop 24 2,9354 ,97317 ,19865 
Power 
Verkoop 31 -,1419 1,00955 ,18132 
Inkoop 24 -,0438 1,02611 ,20945 
Interdependence 
Verkoop 31 5,4323 1,18782 ,21334 
Inkoop 24 5,8271 1,52864 ,31203 
 
Independent sample test  
 Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
F P = t P = (2-tailed) 
DeliveryFlexibility 
Equal variances assumed 3,546 ,065 -,410 ,683 
Equal variances not assumed   -,436 ,664 
Promises 
Equal variances assumed 4,118 ,047 ,405 ,687 
Equal variances not assumed   ,390 ,698 
Threats 
Equal variances assumed ,003 ,960 ,573 ,569 
Equal variances not assumed   ,571 ,571 
LegalPleas 
Equal variances assumed 1,688 ,199 -2,947 ,005 
Equal variances not assumed   -3,055 ,004 
Requests 
Equal variances assumed ,158 ,692 -1,292 ,202 
Equal variances not assumed   -1,299 ,200 
Recommendations 
Equal variances assumed ,091 ,764 -1,387 ,171 
Equal variances not assumed   -1,333 ,190 
BuyerDependence 
Equal variances assumed ,261 ,611 -,996 ,324 
Equal variances not assumed   -1,008 ,318 
SupplierDependencee
pendence 
Equal variances assumed 5,503 ,023 -,707 ,483 
Equal variances not assumed   -,664 ,511 
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Power 
Equal variances assumed ,015 ,904 -,355 ,724 
Equal variances not assumed   -,354 ,725 
Interdependence 
Equal variances assumed 2,685 ,107 -1,079 ,286 
Equal variances not assumed   -1,045 ,302 
If P = Values larger then 0.05: Equal variances assumed 
If P = value p =0.05 or less: Equal variances not assumed 
P = (2-tailed) value equal or less than 0.05 means significant difference in the mean score 
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APPENDIX D  T-TEST  
Differences items buyer’s and supplier’s  
Group Statistics 
 Inkoop of verkoop N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
SDF1 - Betrouwbare levertijden Verkoop 31 3,97 1,169 ,210 
Inkoop 24 4,29 ,751 ,153 
DSF2 - Op tijd leveren Verkoop 31 4,03 1,278 ,229 
Inkoop 24 4,21 ,779 ,159 
SDF3 - Kleine q, hoge frequentie 
Verkoop 31 3,97 1,378 ,247 
Inkoop 24 3,88 ,992 ,202 
SDF4 - Vervroegd leveren 
Verkoop 31 3,74 1,264 ,227 
Inkoop 24 3,88 ,680 ,139 
SDF5 - Nauwkeurig in q 
Verkoop 31 4,35 1,018 ,183 
Inkoop 24 4,29 ,751 ,153 
Pro1 - Klant belooft iets in ruil 
Verkoop 31 2,97 1,110 ,199 
Inkoop 24 2,67 1,239 ,253 
Pro2 - Fin. voordelen bij 
samenwerking 
Verkoop 31 2,81 1,276 ,229 
Inkoop 24 2,67 1,404 ,287 
Pro3 - Klant stimuleert 
aanpassingen 
Verkoop 31 3,06 1,209 ,217 
Inkoop 24 3,29 1,197 ,244 
Pro4 - Meer orders bij minder 
marge 
Verkoop 31 3,19 1,223 ,220 
Inkoop 24 4,00 1,022 ,209 
Pro5 - Terughoudend dan 
voordelen 
Verkoop 31 2,13 1,147 ,206 
Inkoop 24 2,25 1,294 ,264 
Thr1 - Klant dreigt met sancties 
Verkoop 31 3,16 1,293 ,232 
Inkoop 24 2,96 1,429 ,292 
Thr2 - Klant bestelt minder 
Verkoop 31 2,97 1,251 ,225 
Inkoop 24 2,96 1,233 ,252 
Thr3 - Klant betaalt minder 
Verkoop 31 2,68 1,447 ,260 
Inkoop 24 2,21 1,318 ,269 
Thr4 - Klant maakt het moeilijk Verkoop 31 2,32 1,222 ,219 
Inkoop 24 1,92 1,100 ,225 
Thr5 - Klant dreigt stopzetting 
Verkoop 31 2,68 1,326 ,238 
Inkoop 24 2,58 1,316 ,269 
Thr6 - Klant dreigt met minder 
zaken 
Verkoop 31 2,87 1,310 ,235 
Inkoop 24 3,13 1,393 ,284 
LP1 - Verwijst naar contract Verkoop 31 3,48 1,363 ,245 
Inkoop 24 4,46 ,721 ,147 
LP2 - Verwijst naar juridische deals Verkoop 31 2,71 1,321 ,237 
Inkoop 24 3,50 1,142 ,233 
LP3 - Herinnert aan contract 
Verkoop 31 3,48 1,208 ,217 
Inkoop 24 4,17 ,868 ,177 
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LP4 - Gebruikt contract 
Verkoop 31 3,06 1,237 ,222 
Inkoop 24 3,75 1,189 ,243 
Req1 - Alleen vraag 
Verkoop 31 3,45 1,207 ,217 
Inkoop 24 3,88 1,329 ,271 
Req2 - Vraag om acceptatie 
Verkoop 31 2,77 1,087 ,195 
Inkoop 24 2,75 1,113 ,227 
Req3 - Verwacht samenwerking 
Verkoop 31 3,45 1,121 ,201 
Inkoop 24 3,96 1,160 ,237 
Req4 - Geen prikkels nodig 
Verkoop 31 3,61 1,202 ,216 
Inkoop 24 3,96 ,955 ,195 
Recom1 - Beter af 
Verkoop 31 3,03 1,016 ,182 
Inkoop 24 3,33 1,308 ,267 
Recom2 - Bij opvolgen voordelen Verkoop 31 2,97 1,140 ,205 
Inkoop 24 3,13 1,296 ,265 
Recom3 - Verwachte positieve 
gevolgen 
Verkoop 31 3,06 1,063 ,191 
Inkoop 24 3,54 1,318 ,269 
Recom4 - Bewijs voor succes Verkoop 31 2,29 1,071 ,192 
Inkoop 24 2,88 1,329 ,271 
BD1 - Switching costs 
Verkoop 31 2,55 1,179 ,212 
Inkoop 24 3,00 1,142 ,233 
BD2 - Moeilijk vervangbaar Verkoop 31 2,65 1,253 ,225 
Inkoop 24 3,50 1,180 ,241 
BD3 - Techn. expertise 
Verkoop 31 3,19 1,302 ,234 
Inkoop 24 3,04 1,268 ,259 
BD4 - Klant is afhankelijk Verkoop 31 2,48 1,122 ,201 
Inkoop 24 2,71 1,233 ,252 
REC BD5 
Verkoop 31 2,3548 1,17042 ,21021 
Inkoop 24 2,2083 1,10253 ,22505 
BD5 - Alternatieve leveranciers 
Verkoop 31 3,65 1,170 ,210 
Inkoop 24 3,79 1,103 ,225 
SD1 - Omzet belangrijke klant Verkoop 31 4,19 ,749 ,135 
Inkoop 24 3,50 1,216 ,248 
SD2 - Switchting costs 
Verkoop 31 3,19 1,138 ,204 
Inkoop 24 3,17 1,129 ,231 
SD3 - Techn. expertise 
Verkoop 31 2,29 1,189 ,213 
Inkoop 24 2,92 1,139 ,232 
SD4 - Afhankelijk van klant Verkoop 31 2,68 1,045 ,188 
Inkoop 24 2,75 1,327 ,271 
SD5REC 
Verkoop 31 1,5806 ,80723 ,14498 
Inkoop 23 2,2609 1,09617 ,22857 
SD5 - Alternatieve klanten 
Verkoop 31 4,42 ,807 ,145 
Inkoop 24 3,58 1,316 ,269 
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Differences items buyer’s and supplier’s  
Independent sample test  
 Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
F P = t P = (2-
tailed) 
SDF1 - Betrouwbare levertijden Equal variances assumed 1,600 ,211 -1,181 ,243 
Equal variances not assumed   -1,247 ,218 
DSF2 - Op tijd leveren Equal variances assumed 3,088 ,085 -,594 ,555 
Equal variances not assumed   -,631 ,531 
SDF3 - Kleine q, hoge frequentie 
Equal variances assumed ,871 ,355 ,278 ,782 
Equal variances not assumed   ,290 ,773 
SDF4 - Vervroegd leveren 
Equal variances assumed 13,747 ,001 -,466 ,643 
Equal variances not assumed   -,500 ,619 
SDF5 - Nauwkeurig in q 
Equal variances assumed ,987 ,325 ,255 ,800 
Equal variances not assumed   ,265 ,792 
Pro1 - Klant belooft iets in ruil 
Equal variances assumed 1,060 ,308 ,948 ,347 
Equal variances not assumed   ,935 ,355 
Pro2 - Fin. voordelen bij 
samenwerking 
Equal variances assumed ,336 ,565 ,386 ,701 
Equal variances not assumed   ,381 ,705 
Pro3 - Klant stimuleert 
aanpassingen 
Equal variances assumed ,075 ,785 -,694 ,491 
Equal variances not assumed   -,695 ,490 
Pro4 - Meer orders bij minder 
marge 
Equal variances assumed 3,995 ,051 -2,603 ,012 
Equal variances not assumed   -2,663 ,010 
Pro5 - Terughoudend dan 
voordelen 
Equal variances assumed 1,899 ,174 -,367 ,715 
Equal variances not assumed   -,361 ,720 
Thr1 - Klant dreigt met sancties 
Equal variances assumed ,266 ,608 ,551 ,584 
Equal variances not assumed   ,544 ,589 
Thr2 - Klant bestelt minder 
Equal variances assumed ,042 ,839 ,028 ,978 
Equal variances not assumed   ,028 ,978 
Thr3 - Klant betaalt minder 
Equal variances assumed 2,285 ,137 1,239 ,221 
Equal variances not assumed   1,254 ,215 
Thr4 - Klant maakt het moeilijk Equal variances assumed 2,192 ,145 1,276 ,208 
Equal variances not assumed   1,293 ,202 
Thr5 - Klant dreigt stopzetting 
Equal variances assumed ,003 ,958 ,262 ,795 
Equal variances not assumed   ,262 ,794 
Thr6 - Klant dreigt met minder 
zaken 
Equal variances assumed ,538 ,466 -,694 ,491 
Equal variances not assumed   -,688 ,495 
LP1 - Verwijst naar contract Equal variances assumed 8,717 ,005 -3,171 ,003 
Equal variances not assumed   -3,411 ,001 
LP2 - Verwijst naar juridische 
deals 
Equal variances assumed 2,001 ,163 -2,331 ,024 
Equal variances not assumed   -2,376 ,021 
LP3 - Herinnert aan contract Equal variances assumed 3,162 ,081 -2,339 ,023 
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Equal variances not assumed   -2,438 ,018 
LP4 - Gebruikt contract 
Equal variances assumed ,251 ,618 -2,073 ,043 
Equal variances not assumed   -2,084 ,042 
Req1 - Alleen vraag 
Equal variances assumed ,087 ,769 -1,235 ,222 
Equal variances not assumed   -1,219 ,229 
Req2 - Vraag om acceptatie 
Equal variances assumed ,061 ,806 ,081 ,936 
Equal variances not assumed   ,081 ,936 
Req3 - Verwacht samenwerking 
Equal variances assumed ,363 ,550 -1,638 ,107 
Equal variances not assumed   -1,630 ,109 
Req4 - Geen prikkels nodig 
Equal variances assumed 1,541 ,220 -1,153 ,254 
Equal variances not assumed   -1,188 ,240 
Recom1 - Beter af 
Equal variances assumed ,650 ,424 -,961 ,341 
Equal variances not assumed   -,931 ,357 
Recom2 - Bij opvolgen voordelen Equal variances assumed ,047 ,830 -,478 ,635 
Equal variances not assumed   -,470 ,640 
Recom3 - Verwachte positieve 
gevolgen 
Equal variances assumed ,183 ,670 -1,487 ,143 
Equal variances not assumed   -1,447 ,155 
Recom4 - Bewijs voor succes Equal variances assumed ,010 ,921 -1,808 ,076 
Equal variances not assumed   -1,758 ,086 
BD1 - Switching costs 
Equal variances assumed ,768 ,385 -1,428 ,159 
Equal variances not assumed   -1,434 ,158 
BD2 - Moeilijk vervangbaar Equal variances assumed ,037 ,848 -2,574 ,013 
Equal variances not assumed   -2,594 ,012 
BD3 - Techn. expertise 
Equal variances assumed ,127 ,723 ,434 ,666 
Equal variances not assumed   ,436 ,665 
BD4 - Klant is afhankelijk Equal variances assumed ,151 ,699 -,705 ,484 
Equal variances not assumed   -,696 ,490 
REC BD5 
Equal variances assumed ,024 ,878 ,472 ,639 
Equal variances not assumed   ,476 ,636 
BD5 - Alternatieve leveranciers 
Equal variances assumed ,024 ,878 -,472 ,639 
Equal variances not assumed   -,476 ,636 
SD1 - Omzet belangrijke klant Equal variances assumed 7,860 ,007 2,604 ,012 
Equal variances not assumed   2,457 ,019 
SD2 - Switchting costs 
Equal variances assumed ,001 ,973 ,087 ,931 
Equal variances not assumed   ,087 ,931 
SD3 - Techn. expertise 
Equal variances assumed ,475 ,494 -1,973 ,054 
Equal variances not assumed   -1,984 ,053 
SD4 - Afhankelijk van klant Equal variances assumed 2,177 ,146 -,227 ,821 
Equal variances not assumed   -,220 ,827 
SD5REC 
Equal variances assumed 1,635 ,207 -2,628 ,011 
Equal variances not assumed   -2,513 ,016 
SD5 - Alternatieve klanten 
Equal variances assumed 4,246 ,044 2,905 ,005 
Equal variances not assumed   2,739 ,010 
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APPENDIX E Correlations 
 Delivery 
Flex 
Promise
s 
Threats LegalPl Request
s 
Recom
mendati
ons 
Buyer
Dep 
Supplier
Dep 
Power Interd
epend
ence 
Delivery 
Flexibility 
Pearson C 1 ,122 ,224 -,004 ,032 ,160 -,091 -,096 -,009 -,116 
P = (2-t)   ,375 ,100 ,978 ,815 ,245 ,511 ,487 ,948 ,401 
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Promises 
Pearson C  ,122 1 ,011 -,236 -,205 ,154 -,037 ,190 -,178 ,083 
P = (2-t) ,375  ,934 ,082 ,134 ,262 ,789 ,165 ,194 ,546 
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Threats 
Pearson C ,224 ,011 1 ,239 ,217 ,216 -,217 ,225 -,368** -,018 
P = (2-t) ,100 ,934  ,079 ,111 ,113 ,111 ,098 ,006 ,895 
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Legal-
Pleas 
Pearson C -,004 -,236 ,239 1 ,470** ,463** ,191 ,052 ,133 ,159 
P = (2-
tailed) ,978 ,082 ,079 
 
,000 ,000 ,162 ,705 ,334 ,247 
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Requests 
Pearson C ,032 -,205 ,217 ,470** 1 ,201 ,073 -,094 ,137 -,004 
P = (2-t) ,815 ,134 ,111 ,000  ,141 ,599 ,496 ,319 ,974 
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Recomme
ndations 
Pearson C ,160 ,154 ,216 ,463** ,201 1 -,036 ,280* -,246 ,135 
P = (2-t) ,245 ,262 ,113 ,000 ,141  ,795 ,038 ,071 ,324 
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
BuyerDep 
Pearson C -,091 -,037 -,217 ,191 ,073 -,036 1 ,287* ,684** ,838** 
P = (2-t) ,511 ,789 ,111 ,162 ,599 ,795  ,034 ,000 ,000 
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
SupplierD
ep 
Pearson C -,096 ,190 ,225 ,052 -,094 ,280* ,287* 1 -,503** ,763** 
P = (2-t) ,487 ,165 ,098 ,705 ,496 ,038 ,034  ,000 ,000 
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Power 
Pearson C -,009 -,178 -,368** ,133 ,137 -,246 ,684** -,503** 1 ,175 
P = (2-t) ,948 ,194 ,006 ,334 ,319 ,071 ,000 ,000  ,200 
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Interdepe
ndence 
Pearson C -,116 ,083 -,018 ,159 -,004 ,135 ,838** ,763** ,175 1 
P = (2-t) ,401 ,546 ,895 ,247 ,974 ,324 ,000 ,000 ,200  
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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APPENDIX F Vragenlijst Verkoopproffessional 
VRAGENLIJST VOOR DE VERKOOPPROFESSIONAL  
Geachte Linked-In member! 
Hartelijk dank dat u de vragenlijst wilt gaan invullen! 
Wilt u als verkoopprofessional uitgaan van een relatie met een belangrijke klant van 
uw organisatie? 
 
VRAGENLIJST VOOR DE VERKOOPPROFESSIONAL 
 
1. Delivery flexibility 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´delivery flexibility´. Hieronder verstaan we mogelijkheid om leveringen te 
kunnen veranderen qua tijd en hoeveelheid. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• Wij kunnen betrouwbare levertijden afgeven 
• Wij leveren op de afgesproken data. 
• Wij kunnen orders afleveren in kleiner hoeveelheden met een hogere frequentie. 
• Wij kunnen vervroegd leveren bij bijzondere orders of bij spoedbestellingen. 
• Wij zijn nauwkeurig als het gaat om geleverde hoeveelheden. 
 
2. Toezeggingen 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´toezeggingen´. Hieronder verstaan we specifieke beloningen voor het 
tegemoet komen aan speciale wensen. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• De klant beloofd ons iets te geven in ruil voor bijzondere acties van uit onze zijde. 
• Wij krijgen financiële voordelen bij het samenwerken met de klant tot verbetering van 
productkwaliteit, een nieuw productontwerp of andere activiteiten op productiegebied. 
• Wij worden gestimuleerd door de klant tot het aanbrengen van veranderingen in ons 
productieproces en/of andere bedrijfsprocessen. 
• Wij krijgen meer orders van de klant als wij bereid zijn om marge in te leveren of 
leverhoeveelheden aan te passen. 
• Als we in eerste instantie terughoudend zijn om samen te werken, dan krijgen we 
voordelen aangeboden van onze klant. 
 
3. Dreigementen 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´dreigementen´. Hieronder verstaan we het dreigen met negatieve 
gevolgen in de toekomst als er niet met een vraag wordt ingestemd. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• Het wordt ons duidelijk gemaakt door de klant dat we met sancties te maken krijgen als we 
niet voldoen aan zijn verzoeken. 
• De klant dreigt minder te bestellen als wij niet ingaan op zijn verzoeken  
• De klant gebruikt dreigementen tegen ons, zoals uitstel van betaling, het achterhouden van 
een betaling en minder klandizie. 
• De klant maakt duidelijk dat ze het ons “moeilijk kunnen maken” als we niet voldoen aan 
hun eisen. 
• De klant dreigt specifieke opdrachten stop te zetten als niet voldaan wordt aan hun 
verzoeken 
• De klant dreigt minder zaken te doen met ons als we niet aan zijn eisen voldoen. 
 
4. Contractuele verplichtingen 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´contractuele verplichtingen´. Hieronder verstaan we afspraken of 
contractuele overeenkomsten die moeten worden nagekomen. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• De klant verwijst naar het contract, zodat wij moeten voldoen aan specifieke vragen. 
• De klant verwijst naar juridische afspraken die gemaakt zijn om ons te beïnvloeden. 
• De klant herinner ons eraan dat er verplichtingen zijn zoals bepaald in het contract. 
• De klant maakt gebruik van het contract als instrument om ons te laten instemmen met 
hun eisen. 
Do you  
5. Vragen 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´vragen´. Hieronder verstaan we vragen om te voldoen aan een verzoek 
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zonder verdere uitleg. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• De klant vraagt ons om te voldoen aan hun verzoeken, zonder aan te geven of dit leidt tot 
een sanctie of een beloning. 
• De klant vraagt ons om nieuwe ideeën te accepteren, zonder uitleg over de gevolgen voor 
onze bedrijfsvoering. 
• De klant verwacht van ons dat we samenwerken, zonder beloningen of sancties in het 
vooruitzicht te stellen. 
• De klant verwacht van ons dat we geen prikkels nodig hebben om aan zijn verzoeken te 
voldoen. 
 
6. Aanbevelingen 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´aanbevelingen´. Hieronder verstaan we mededelingen welke impliceren 
dat er voordelen te behalen zijn als wordt voldaan aan de wens. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• De klant maakt ons duidelijk dat we er beter van worden als we zijn aanbevelingen 
opvolgen. 
• De klant maakt het ons expliciet duidelijk dat bij het opvolgen van een suggestie, er 
voordeel te halen is voor ons. 
• De klant geeft ons een duidelijk beeld van de te verwachten positieve gevolgen als wij 
instemmen met een aanbevolen actie 
• De klant geeft bewijs waarom wij succes mogen verwachten van de aanbevelingen die zij 
doen. 
 
7. Afhankelijkheid van klant 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´afhankelijkheid van de klant´. Hieronder verstaan de afhankelijkheid van 
de 
klant met betrekking tot zijn bedrijfsprocessen ten aanzien van de leverancier. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• De klant moet hoge kosten maken om ons te vervangen.  
• Wij zijn voor de klant op korte termijn moeilijk om te vervangen 
• De klant heeft onze technologische expertise nodig  
• De klant is afhankelijk van ons als leverancier. 
• Er zijn andere leveranciers die ons product ook kunnen leveren. 
 
8. Afhankelijkheid van leverancier 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´afhankelijkheid van de leverancier´. Hieronder verstaan de afhankelijkheid 
van de leverancier met betrekking tot zijn bedrijfsprocessen ten aanzien van de klant. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• De klant is, wat omzet betreft, belangrijk voor ons. 
• Wij moeten hoge kosten maken om de klant te vervangen. 
• Wij hebben de expertise van onze klant nodig. 
• Wij zijn afhankelijk van deze klant. 
• Er zijn andere klanten waar wij onze producten kunnen verkopen. 
 
Achtergrondgegevens: 
1. Ik ben: 
- Een vrouw 
- Een man 
 
2. Mijn leeftijd 
- Jonger dan 35 jaar 
- 35 tot er met 44 jaar 
- 45 tot er met 54 jaar 
- 55 tot er met 64 jaar 
- 65 jaar en ouder 
 
3. Mijn functie is: 
- Verkoopmedewerker 
- Verkoopleider 
- Projectmanager 
- Anders namelijk 
 
4. Bedrijfsgrootte: 
- Eigen bedrijf / eenmanszaak 
- Bedrijf tot 20 medewerkers 
- Bedrijf 21 tot 50 medewerkers 
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- Bedrijf 51 tot 250 medewerkers 
- Bedrijf groter dan 250 medewerker 
 
5. Opleiding: 
- Lager middelbaar onderwijs of lager beroepsonderwijs (LBO / LTS / MAVO) 
- Middelbaar onderwijs of middelbaar beroepsonderwijs (MBO/ HAVO/ VWO) 
- Hoger beroepsonderwijs (HBO) 
- Universiteit 
- Ander, namelijk 
 
Hartelijk dank voor uw medewerking! 
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APPENDIX G Vragenlijst Inkoopprofessional 
VRAGENLIJST VOOR DE INKOOPPROFESSIONAL  
Geachte Linked-In member! 
Hartelijk dank dat u de vragenlijst wilt gaan invullen! 
Wilt u als inkoopprofessional uitgaan van een relatie met een belangrijke leverancier 
van uw organisatie? 
 
VRAGENLIJST VOOR DE INKOOPPROFESSIONAL 
 
1. Delivery flexibility 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´delivery flexibility´. Hieronder verstaan we mogelijkheid om leveringen te 
kunnen veranderen qua tijd en hoeveelheid. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• De leverancier kan betrouwbare levertijden afgeven 
• De leverancier levert op de afgesproken data. 
• De leverancier kan orders afleveren in kleiner hoeveelheden met een hogere frequentie. 
• De leverancier kan vervroegd leveren bij bijzondere orders of bij spoedbestellingen.  
• De leverancier is nauwkeurig als het gaat om geleverde hoeveelheden. 
2. Toezeggingen 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´toezeggingen´. Hieronder verstaan we specifieke beloningen voor het 
tegemoet komen aan speciale wensen. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• Wij beloven om iets terug te geven in ruil voor bijzondere acties van de leverancier. 
• Wij geven financiële voordelen als de leverancier samenwerkt bij het verbeteren van 
productkwaliteit, een nieuw productontwerp en andere activiteiten op productiegebied.  
• Wij stimuleren de leverancier tot het aanbrengen van veranderingen in diens 
productieproces en/of andere bedrijfsprocessen. 
• Wij geven meer orders aan de leverancier als deze bereid is om diens marge of 
leverhoeveelheden aan te passen.  
• Leveranciers die in eerste instantie terughoudend zijn, bieden wij voordelen aan om met 
ons samen te werken.  
 
3. Dreigementen 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´dreigementen´. Hieronder verstaan we het dreigen met negatieve 
gevolgen in de toekomst als er niet met een vraag wordt ingestemd. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• We maken duidelijk dat de leverancier te maken krijgt met sancties als deze niet voldoet 
aan onze verzoeken. 
• We dreigen minder te bestellen bij de leverancier als deze niet ingaat op onze verzoeken 
• We gebruiken dreigementen tegen de leverancier, zoals uitstel van betaling, het 
achterhouden van een betaling en minder klandizie. 
• We maken duidelijk dat we het “moeilijk kunnen maken” voor de leverancier als deze niet 
voldoet aan onze eisen. 
• We dreigen om specifieke opdrachten stop te zetten als niet voldoen wordt aan onze 
verzoeken 
• We dreigen minder zaken te doen met de leverancier die niet aan onze eisen voldoet.  
 
4. Contractuele verplichtingen 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´contractuele verplichtingen´. Hieronder verstaan we afspraken of 
contractuele overeenkomsten die moeten worden nagekomen. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• We verwijzen naar het contract, zodat de leverancier voldoet aan specifieke vragen. 
• We verwijzen naar juridische afspraken die gemaakt zijn om de leverancier te beïnvloeden. 
• We herinneren de leverancier aan diens verplichtingen zoals bepaald in het contract. 
• We maken gebruik van het contract als instrument om de leverancier te laten instemmen 
met onze eisen. 
Do you  
5. Vragen 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´vragen´. Hieronder verstaan we vragen om te voldoen aan een verzoek 
zonder verdere uitleg. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• Wij vragen aan de leverancier om te voldoen aan onze verzoeken, zonder aan te geven of 
dit leidt tot een sanctie of een beloning. 
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• We vragen de leverancier om nieuwe ideeën te accepteren, zonder uitleg over de gevolgen 
voor diens bedrijfsvoering. 
• Wij verwachten dat  de leverancier met ons samenwerkt, zonder beloningen of sancties in 
het vooruitzicht te stellen.  
• We verwachten dat de leverancier geen prikkels nodig heeft om aan onze verzoeken te 
voldoen.  
 
6. Aanbevelingen 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´aanbevelingen´. Hieronder verstaan we mededelingen welke impliceren 
dat er voordelen te behalen zijn als wordt voldaan aan de wens. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• We maken duidelijk dat de leverancier er beter van worden, als deze onze aanbevelingen 
opvolgt. 
• We maken het de leverancier expliciet duidelijk dat bij het opvolgen van een suggestie, er 
voordeel te halen is voor de leverancier zelf. 
• Wij geven een duidelijk beeld van de te verwachten positieve gevolgen als d leverancier 
instemt met een aanbevolen actie 
• We geven bewijs waarom de leverancier succes mag verwachten van de aanbevelingen die 
wij doen. 
 
7. Afhankelijkheid van klant 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´afhankelijkheid van de klant´. Hieronder verstaan de afhankelijkheid van 
de 
klant met betrekking tot zijn bedrijfsprocessen ten aanzien van de leverancier. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• Wij moeten hoge kosten maken om de leverancier te vervangen.  
• De leverancier is moeilijk om op korte termijn te vervangen 
• Wij hebben de technologische expertise nodige waarover de leverancier beschikt.  
• Wij zijn afhankelijk van de leverancier.  
• Er zijn andere leveranciers die het product ook kunnen leveren. 
 
8. Afhankelijkheid van leverancier 
De volgende vragen gaan over ´afhankelijkheid van de leverancier´. Hieronder verstaan de afhankelijkheid 
van de leverancier met betrekking tot zijn bedrijfsprocessen ten aanzien van de klant. 
Volledig mee oneens         Volledig mee eens 
• Wij zijn, wat omzet betreft, een belangrijke klant voor de leverancier.  
• De leverancier moet hoge kosten maken om de klant te vervangen.  
• De leverancier heeft onze expertise nodig. 
• De leverancier is afhankelijk van ons. 
• Er zijn andere kopers waar de leverancier zijn producten kan verkopen. 
 
Achtergrondgegevens: 
1. Ik ben: 
- Een vrouw 
- Een man 
 
2. Mijn leeftijd 
- Jonger dan 35 jaar 
- 35 tot er met 44 jaar 
- 45 tot er met 54 jaar 
- 55 tot er met 64 jaar 
- 65 jaar en ouder 
 
3. Mijn functie is: 
- Verkoopmedewerker 
- Verkoopleider 
- Projectmanager 
- Anders namelijk 
 
4. Bedrijfsgrootte: 
- Eigen bedrijf / eenmanszaak 
- Bedrijf tot 20 medewerkers 
- Bedrijf 21 tot 50 medewerkers 
- Bedrijf 51 tot 250 medewerkers 
- Bedrijf groter dan 250 medewerker 
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5. Opleiding: 
- Lager middelbaar onderwijs of lager beroepsonderwijs (LBO / LTS / MAVO) 
- Middelbaar onderwijs of middelbaar beroepsonderwijs (MBO/ HAVO/ VWO) 
- Hoger beroepsonderwijs (HBO) 
- Universiteit 
- Ander, namelijk 
 
Hartelijk dank voor uw medewerking! 
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APPENDIX H Questionnaire Sales Professional 
Questionnaire for Sales Professional  
 
Dear Linked-In member! 
 
Many customers would like to have his supplier more flexible; many suppliers feel 
the pressure of this. In this thesis we are looking for the influence of the power 
position on the strategies for delivery flexibility. 
We kindly ask you as sales professional to fill in this online survey. 
The participation is of course anonymous and takes about 5 minutes. 
Would you please consider a relation with one of you most important customers? 
 
Questionnaire Sales Professional 
 
1. Delivery flexibility 
The following questions are about delivery flexibility. This means the ability to change planned or 
assumed delivery dates and delivery quantities by the supplier  
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• We are able to make dependable delivery promises 
• We can deliver products on promised due dates 
• We can deliver in smaller lots and ship more frequently without raising our stock levels 
• We can move planned delivery dates forward to accommodate rush orders or special orders 
• We can meet the accuracy of delivery quantities 
 
2. Promises 
The following questions are about promises. This means specific rewards if the supplier conforms to the 
stated desires  
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• We are made promises by our customer receiving something back in return for specific 
actions  
• Our customer provides price premiums or other incentives for our participation or 
cooperation in product quality improvement, new product design, and other manufacturing 
actives 
• Our customer offers specific incentives to us to make changes in manufacturing and/or 
operating procedures 
• Our customer offers to order more if we lower our margin or delivery quantities 
• Our customer offers incentives to us when we are initially being reluctant to cooperate with 
a new program or policy 
 
3. Threats 
The following questions are about threats. This means the threatening the supplier with future negative 
sanctions if there is no comply with a request 
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• Our customer makes it clear that failing to comply with their requests will result in 
penalties against our business 
• Our customer threats lesser purchase to us if we should fail to agree to their requests 
• Our customer threatens to disturb our business, such as slow payment time for supplies, 
holding back payment, and lower pull-in rates 
• Our customer communicates their ability to make “things difficult” for our business if 
specific demands are not met 
• Our customer states that specific orders will be discontinued for not complying their 
requests 
• Our customer threatens to reduce the amount of business we do with their firm, should 
their demands not be met 
 
4. Legalistic Pleas 
The following questions are about legalistic pleas. This means that compliance is required by legal 
contract or agreement 
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• Our customer refers to portions of purchasing agreement which favor their position to gain 
our compliance on a particular demand 
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• Our customer makes a point to refer to any legal agreements they have when attempting 
to influence our actions 
• Our customer reminds us to our obligations stipulated in purchasing agreement 
• Our customer uses sections of our purchasing agreement as a “tool” getting us to agree to 
their demands 
Do you  
5. Request 
The following questions are about requests. This means simply asking the supplier to comply without 
mentioning any sanctions or rewards 
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• The customer asks us for compliance to their requests, not indicating any positive or 
negative outcome for our business contingent on our compliance 
• The customer asks us to accept new ideas without an explanation of what effect it will have 
on our business 
• The customer asks for our cooperation in implementing new programs without mentioning 
rewards for complying, or punishments for refusing  
• The customer expects that their requests do not require an incentive for us to comply 
 
6. Recommendations 
The following questions are about recommendations. This is about informing that there will be more 
profit for the supplier if it achieves specific desired outcomes 
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• The customer makes it clear that by following their recommendations, our business will 
benefit 
• Our customer makes it explicit, when making a suggestion, that it is intended for the good 
of our operation 
• The customer provides a clear picture of the anticipated positive impact on our business a 
recommended course of action will have 
• The customer outlines the logic and/or evidence for expecting success from the specific 
programs and actions suggested 
 
7. Buyer dependence 
The following questions are about buyer independence. The dependence on the supplier with respect 
to processing the business 
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• We would be costly to lose 
• We would be difficult to replace 
• The customer needs our expertise 
• The customer is dependent on us 
• There are more suppliers for this product 
 
8. Supplier dependence 
The following questions are about supplier dependence.  The dependence of the supplier on you with 
respect to processing the business  
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• Our customer would be costly to lose 
• Our customer would be difficult to replace  
• We need the customers’ expertise 
• We are dependent on our customer  
• We can sell this product to other customers 
 
Back ground 
1. I am:  
- Male 
- Female 
 
2. My age is:  
- Less then 35 year 
- 35 – 44 year 
- 45 – 54 year  
- 55 year and older 
 
3. My position is:  
- Sales representative 
- Sales manager 
- Project manager 
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- Other  .................. 
 
4. Company size: 
- Sole proprietorship 
- 2  -20 people 
- 21-50 people 
- 51-250 people 
- More than 250 people 
 
1. Education:  
- High school or primairy vocational education  
- Atheneum / Gymnasium or secondary vocational education 
- Bachelor degree 
- Master degree 
- Other ...... 
 
Thanks a lot! 
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APPENDIX I Questionnaire Purchase Professional 
Questionnaire for Purchase Professional  
 
Dear Linked-In member! 
 
Many customers would like to have his supplier more flexible; many suppliers feel 
the pressure of this. In this thesis we are looking for the influence of the power 
position on the strategies for delivery flexibility. 
We kindly ask you as purchase professional to fill in this online survey. 
The participation is of course anonymous and takes about 5 minutes. 
Would you please consider a relation with one of you most important suppliers? 
 
Questionnaire Purchase Professional 
 
1. Delivery flexibility 
The following questions are about delivery flexibility. This means the ability to change planned or 
assumed delivery dates and delivery quantities by the supplier  
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• Supplier is able to make dependable delivery promises 
• Supplier can deliver its products on promised due dates 
• Supplier can deliver in smaller lots and ship more frequently to replenish our stock levels 
• Supplier can to move planned delivery dates forward to accommodate rush orders or 
special orders 
• Supplier can meet the accuracy of delivery quantities 
 
2. Promises 
The following questions are about promises. This means specific rewards if the supplier conforms to the 
stated desires  
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• We make promises to give something back in return for specific actions of suppliers 
• We provide price premiums or other incentives for suppliers’ participation or cooperation in 
product quality improvement, new product design, and other manufacturing actives 
• We offer specific incentives for suppliers to make changes in manufacturing and/or 
operating procedures 
• We offer more orders for suppliers’ meeting cost-down margin or delivery quantities 
• We offer incentives to suppliers when they initially had been reluctant to cooperate with a 
new program or policy 
 
3. Threats 
The following questions are about threats. This means the threatening the supplier with future negative 
sanctions if there is no comply with a request 
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• We make it clear that failing to comply with our requests will result in penalties against 
suppliers’ business 
• We threaten lesser purchase to suppliers’ business should they fail to agree to our requests 
• We use threats of disturbing suppliers’ business, such as slow payment time for supplies, 
holding payment, and lower pull-in rates 
• We communicate our ability to make “things difficult” for suppliers’ business if specific 
demands are not met 
• We state that specific orders will be discontinued for not complying with requests 
• We threaten to reduce the amount of business supplier will do with our firm, should our 
demands not be met 
 
4. Legalistic Pleas 
The following questions are about legalistic pleas. This means that compliance is required by legal 
contract or agreement 
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• We refer to portions of purchasing agreement which favor our position to gain suppliers’ 
compliance on a particular demand 
• We make a point to refer to any legal agreements we have when attempting to influence 
suppliers’ actions 
• We remind suppliers that any of their obligations stipulated in purchasing agreement 
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• We use sections of our purchasing agreement as a “tool” to get supplier to agree to our 
demands 
Do you  
5. Request 
The following questions are about requests. This means simply asking the supplier to comply without 
mentioning any sanctions or rewards 
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• We ask for suppliers’ compliance to our requests, not indicating any positive or negative 
outcome for their business contingent on their compliance 
• We ask supplier to accept new ideas without an explanation of what effect it will have on 
their business 
• We ask suppliers’ cooperation in implementing new programs without mentioning rewards 
for complying, or punishments for refusing  
• We expect that our requests do not require an incentive for suppliers to comply 
 
6. Recommendations 
The following questions are about recommendations. This is about informing that there will be more 
profit for the supplier if it achieves specific desired outcomes 
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• We make it clear that by following our recommendations, suppliers’ business would benefit 
• We make it explicit, when making a suggestion, that it is intended for the good of suppliers’ 
operation 
• We provide a clear picture of the anticipated positive impact on suppliers’ business a 
recommended course of action will have 
• We outline the logic and/or evidence for expecting success from the specific programs and 
actions suggested 
 
7. Buyer dependence 
The following questions are about buyer independence. The dependence on the supplier with respect 
to processing the business 
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• Our supplier would be costly to lose 
• Our supplier would be difficult to replace 
• We need the suppliers’ expertise 
• We are dependent on our supplier 
• There are more suppliers for this product 
 
8. Supplier dependence 
The following questions are about supplier dependence.  The dependence of the supplier on you with 
respect to processing the business  
Strongly disagree          Completely agree 
• Our supplier would find it costly to lose us 
• Our supplier would find it difficult to replace us 
• Our supplier needs our expertise 
• Our supplier is dependent on us  
• The suppliers can sell this product to other customers 
 
Back ground 
5. I am:  
- Male 
- Female 
 
6. My age is:  
- Less then 35 year 
- 35 – 44 year 
- 45 – 54 year  
- 55 year and older 
 
7. My position is:  
- Sales representative 
- Sales manager 
- Project manager 
- Other  .................. 
 
8. Company size: 
- Sole proprietorship 
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- 2  -20 people 
- 21-50 people 
- 51-250 people 
- More than 250 people 
 
2. Education:  
- High school or primairy vocational education  
- Atheneum / Gymnasium or secondary vocational education 
- Bachelor degree 
- Master degree 
- Other ...... 
 
Thanks a lot! 
 
